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THE MYTH OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE
ANTI-ADMINISTRATIVE IMPULSE
Edward Rubin*

The idea of accountability is very much in fashion in legal and
political thought these days. To be sure, the term is used in a variety of
different ways, but that is the nature of fashion. Colored cloth ponchos
may be in fashion this season, for example, but they can be shaped and
colored in a variety of different ways. It is differences of this sort that
sustain a fashion trend. If the only poncho available were red and
square, the fashion trend would display an impressive unity, but it
wouldn't last very long. In order to make sales, clothing designers
need a style that is recognizable but vague enough to include a lot of
variation. And once this style takes off, gaining popularity from the
many different designs available within it, the manufacturers can cash
in by taking the tired old designs that weren't selling last year and
producing them as colored ponchos. It is pretty much the same with
accountability.
Accountability can be roughly defined as the ability of one actor to
demand an explanation or justification of another actor for its actions
and to reward or punish that second actor on the basis of its
performance or its explanation. This Article focuses on two of the
leading uses of this term in contemporary scholarship, two uses that
have contributed heavily to the current fashion for accountability. The
first is based on the idea that elected officials - legislators and the
chief executive - are accountable to the people, while officials who
obtained their position by appointment or examination are not.1 From
this, some observers have concluded that authority should be shifted
to elected officials: that policy decisions should be made by legislators,
not administrators, that all administrators should be controlled by an
elected chief executive, and that the federal government should not
intrude on the authority of elected officials in the states. The second
use of accountability is that local institutions are more accountable to
the people or that people should be given the opportunity to be
accountable for themselves.2 From this, other observers have
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1. See infra notes 7-9 (citing sources).
2. See infra notes 82 & 101 (citing sources).
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concluded that authority should be devolved from the central
government to localities and individuals, and that policy should be
made by officials at the local level or by private parties.
Some of the proposals that have been associated with these two
ideas of accountability have obvious merits, some have subtle merits,
and some have obvious or subtle demerits. Very few of them,
however, have very much to do with the concept of accountability.
Invocation of this concept confers a certain cachet on these proposals
- it makes them fashionable - but it neither justifies nor illuminates
them. One goal of this Article to is reveal the conceptual and
empirical defects in these two uses of accountability. The ideas of
shifting authority to elected officials and devolving it to localities and
individuals will not be critiqued in general, although there is much to
be said on this subject. Rather, the argument is that neither of these
two ideas is entitled to invoke the notion of accountability. They are
old, frumpy garments, and we should not allow them to disguise
themselves as modern by taking on the external appearance of a
current fashion.
One would expect that a discussion of these two disparate uses of
accountability would necessarily be a bifurcated one. After all, the
idea that elected officials are accountable rests on the principle of
election, where one chooses another to express or represent her views,
while the idea that local institutions and individuals are accountable
rests on the principle of devolution, where power is shifted to local
institutions or private parties so that people make their voice known
more effectively or take responsibility for their own actions. But these
concepts, although divided in their rationale, are unified in their most
serious defect. What they share is a preanalytic hostility to the modem
administrative state, an anti-bureaucratic pastoralism that feeds on
nostalgia for simpler, more integrated times.3 The instinct is
understandable, but it represents a genuine intellectual sin because it
distracts our attention from the government we actually possess. That
government can be altered and improved, of course - sometimes in
the ways that the proponents of accountability suggest - but there is
no foreseeable possibility that it will undergo an essential alteration,
and none of those who express hostility toward it have advanced any
realistic scenario by which such an alteration could occur. Any
proposal that avoids this ineluctable reality of modem government
runs a serious risk of doing more harm than good.4

3. Regarding the pastoral impulse, see RAYMOND WILLIAMS, THE COUNTRY AND THE
CITY 13-45 (1973).
4. Regarding the "escape proof' nature of administrative government, see 3 MAX
WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 987-89 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968); id.
app. II at 1393, 1401-02.
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Because the two approaches to accountability share the same
defect, a criticism of them on the basis of this defect can generate the
unified theory of political-legal accountability that their more
fashionable uses fail to provide.5 One reason that these anti
administrative ideas about elections and participation invoke the term
accountability, apart from its cachet, is that they are attempting to
expropriate a concept that is essentially administrative in nature, to
inoculate themselves against administrative realities by adapting some
of those realities for their own anti-administrative purposes. As stated,
both approaches spring from the observer's unanalyzed hostility to the
administrative state. But true accountability, in the realm of law and
politics, involves many of the features that are central to the
administrative state and that people find so unattractive about it hierarchy, monitoring, reporting, internal rules, investigations, and j ob
evaluations. Far from being the warm and fuzzy notion that some of its
proponents seem to envision, accountability flows along the complex,
hierarchical pathways that structure modern government, and reveals
the managerial mechanisms of a people who are, in Genet's words,
"no longer childlike but severe."6
Part I of this paper critiques the idea that accountability can be
secured by elections. Part II critiques the idea that it can secured by
devolution to localities or private parties. Part III then presents the
remaining and, it will be argued, only coherent concept of
accountability and argues that it is intrinsically bureaucratic or
administrative in character.
I.

ACCOUNTABILITY AND ELECTIONS

As just discussed, accountability clearly means something distinctly
different, at the operational level, when used as argument for the
authority of elected officials, than it does when used as an argument
for devolution to localities or private parties. But the election-related
arguments for accountability, although they are readily distinguished
from the devolution-related ones, do not display any particular
conceptual unity among themselves. There are at least three such
arguments: first, that legislators, being elected officials who are
accountable to the people, should make basic policy decisions and not

5. The arguments to be critiqued lie in this area of law and politics, and the alternative
that will be proposed is limited to this area as well. No effort will be made to consider issues
of accountability in personal life. For an illuminating discussion of this issue, see Anita L.
Allen, 2003 Daniel J. Meador Lecture: Privacy Isn't Everything: Accountability as a Personal
and Social Good, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1375 (2003).
6. JEAN GENET, THE THIEF'S JOURNAL (Bernard Frechtman trans., Bantam B ooks
1965) (1949).
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delegate extensive authority to administrators;7 second, that the
president, being an elected official who is accountable to the people,
should control all executive agencies, including those that are
currently independent;8 and third, that elected state officials, because
they are accountable to the people, should not be subject to policy
control by the federal government.9 For convenience, these arguments
can be divided into two separate sub-categories, the first involving
federal officials and their control of the bureaucracy, the second
involving state officials and their relationship to the federal
government as a whole. These will be considered in tum.
A.

Federal Officials and Control of the Bureaucracy:

The Nondelegation and Unitary Executive Arguments

Even within the subcategory of accountability arguments that
involve elected federal officials, the arguments themselves are not
consistent. The idea of legislative accountability opposes open-ended
delegations of authority to administrative agents, but the idea of
presidential accountability derives its justification from the existence
of such delegations and the need for an elected official to control their
exercise. To put this another way, more detailed and definitive
legislation would place agencies under greater Congressional control
and thus detract from the president's ability to guide these agencies in
furtherance of his policy objectives. This contradiction already points
to a certain vagueness and instability in the concept of accountability.
Despite this conflict, however, the two arguments are united in their
7. JOHN ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 131-34 (1980); FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE
ROAD TO SERFDOM (1968); THEODORE S. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND
REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 92-126 (2d ed. 1979); MARTIN H. REDISH, THE
CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE (1995); DAYID SCHOENBROD, POWER
WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH
DELEGATION (1993); Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1982); Marci A. Hamilton, Representation and Nondelegation: Back to
Basics, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 807 (1999); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the
Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994); Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs
and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional
Theory, 74 vA. L. REV. 471 (1988).
8. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The president's Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural
Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992); Lawson,
supra note 7; Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41.
9. Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer
State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1995); Vicki C. Jackson,
Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180,
2195-2205 (1998); Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role,
79 COLUM. L. REV. 847, 890 (1979); D. Bruce La Pierre, Political Accountability in the
National Political Process - The Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 Nw.
U. L. REV. 577 (1985); Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula
for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1563 (1994).
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primary defect. Both rest on the assumption that elections provide
accountability, that is, that an elected official must answer to his
constituents for his actions. A realistic, contemporary consideration of
elections suggests that this relationship to accountability, although not
entirely absent, is a relatively minor aspect of the electoral process.
One of the most important functions elections do serve is to solve
the problem of succession.10 Dictatorships are virtually guaranteed to
undergo a succession crisis with the death of the dictator, if not before;
hereditary monarchies undergo such crises when the monarch fails to
produce an heir or when a rival claimant exists. At best, succession
crises of this sort disrupt orderly government relations; at worst, they
lead to civil war. Moreover, the looming threat of a succession crisis
tends to undermine the effectiveness of government. Those who aspire
to succeed the ruler must build their own power base, withdrawing
their resources from the collectivity, devoting their efforts to self
aggrandizement, and attracting allies to their cause.11 This activity is
often regarded as disloyal by the ruler, and with good reason, since the
same actions that position someone to succeed the rule can position that
person to stage a coup while the ruler is alive. Thus, these actions must
be conducted clandestinely, and the ruler is induced to devote much
effort to discovering and combating this potentially threatening activity.
A functioning electoral democracy provides a remarkably
successful solution to this problem. The regular election of political
leaders assures an orderly succession and generally avoids difficulties
resulting from the death or incapacity of the existing leaders. It
replaces the disruption and inefficiency produced by efforts to succeed
the leader with a constructive process. Positioning oneself for
succession in an electoral regime, far from being regarded as disloyal,
is a highly acceptable activity that confers prestige on any plausible
candidate. The best way to do so, moreover, is to offer criticisms that
significant parts of the populace regard as helpful or to demonstrate
that one can govern by acting effectively in one's present position.
These strategies need not be conducted secretly; in fact, they are
generally most effective when openly pursued. The leader may choose
to combat them but does so most effectively by open debate or
efficient governance; more disruptive efforts to thwart opposition are
disfavored and expose the leader to serious political risk. Well
established electoral democracies achieve these beneficial results
habitually and irenically. Although much effort, and often much
anguish, is expended on the contest between opposing candidates for
office, the process of holding the election and the succession that it

10. Edward L. Rubin Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711 (2001).
,

11. See PETER F. DRUCKER, THE NEW SOCIETY 210-212 (1951); H.R. TREVOR-ROPER,
THE LAST DAYS OF HITLER 3-10 (1947).
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determines occur as a matter of course, so much so that people often
forget that the greatest virtue of elections is that they solve the
problem of succession.
A second crucial function of elections is to produce a government
that is responsive to the people's basic desires. They achieve this
through the process of representation that is central to our conception
of elections, 12 although not to elections in general.13 In voting for
candidates in a general political election, people tend to choose the
person whom they believe will represent their interests most
effectively14 - this often means a person of their own ethnic
background or a person who can convincingly demonstrate that she has
the same attitudes and beliefs as the voters. Background and beliefs are
influential because voters want someone to represent them, that is, to
re-present their views in government decisionmaking situations.
This is not accountability, but the opposite of accountability.
Voters want to choose a like-minded person because they believe that
such a person will take the actions they prefer, even though they are
not able to supervise or monitor the person. They know that
government policy will involve a succession of quotidian decisions,
complex judgments, recondite bargains, and other actions that will be
beyond their understanding and attention span. When someone is
choosing a subordinate who is truly accountable - whom the person
can monitor on a continuous basis - there is at least a tendency to
choose the most talented or capable individual, regardless of his
personal views, and rely on instructions to make sure he does what his
superior wants. In elections, on the other hand, people generally
prefer to choose someone who will act in their interests because she
shares their perspective.
Holding the representative accountable is a third function of
elections, but it is subsidiary to succession and representation. There is
an ongoing debate about whether elected officials are more motivated
by ideological considerations or by the desire to be re-elected.15 Even
12. See HANNAH FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1972).
13. Some of the medieval models from which modern elections derive, such as the
election of the Pope or the Holy Roman Emperor, were not conceived in representational
terms. See PAULA SUITER FICHTNER, THE HABSBURG MONARCHY, 1490-1848:
AITRIBUTES OF EMPIRE (2003).
14. Benjamin I. Page & Robert Y. Shapiro, Effects ofPublic Opinion on Policy, 77 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 175 (1983).
15. See RICHARD F. FENNO JR., CONGRESSMEN IN COMMIITEES (1973) (ideological
motivation); MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON
ESTABLISHMENT (2d ed. 1989); LAWRENCE R. JACOBS & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO,
POLITICIANS DON'T PANDER: POLITICAL MANIPULATION AND THE LOSS OF DEMOCRATIC
RESPONSIVENESS (2000) (ideological motivation); DA YID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE
ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974) (re-election motivation); WILLIAM K. MUIR JR.,
LEGISLATURE: CALIFORNIA'S SCHOOL FOR POLITTCS (1982) (ideological motivation). The
re-election approach is associated with public choice analysis. See DANIEL A. FARBER &
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if one assumes that electoral considerations predominate, however,
their effect is likely to be attenuated by a variety of factors.
Incumbents are difficult to defeat, which means that the electorate's
initial choices tend to become locked in place.16 In addition, the
president is often a lame duck, as are a number of senators. Most
important, however, is that intermittent, highly contested elections are
simply very poor devices for holding a person accountable. Most
electoral democracies present the voters with only two or three
realistic choices, which means that a multitude of issues must map into
a small decision set. This is the result of party politics, a feature of
democracy that generally develops outside the constitutional structure
but is just as central to its operation as the constitutional provisions. A
small decision set means that even perfectly informed voters must
make their choice on the basis of the few issues they regard as most
important and then accept their representative's decisions on the other
issues, whether they approve of her decision or not.17
Most voters, moreover, are not perfectly informed about the
issues, and the evidence suggests that they often suffer from
apocalyptic levels of ignorance.18 Some classic voter studies conclude
that people's choices can generally be predicted from their social
characteristics, without regard to any particular features of the person
they are voting for.19 More recent studies grant a larger role to
attitudes but identify these attitudes as very general party affiliations
or impressions of the candidate's personality.20 Even if voter attitudes
are issue-oriented, they tend to be stable, long-term preferences on
PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC
CHOICE III (2003).
16. See GARY C. JACOBSON, THE POLITICS OF CoNGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (5th ed.,
2001); JONATHAN S. KRASNO, CHALLENGERS, COMPETITION AND REELECTION (1994);
John R. Alford & David W. Brady, Personal and Partisan Advantage in U.S. Congressional
Elections, 1846-1990, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 141, 149 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I.
Oppenheimer eds., 5th ed. 1993); Gary W. Cox & Jonathan N. Katz, Why Did the
Incumbency Advantage in U.S. House Elections Grow?, 40 AM J. POL. SCI. 478 (1996);
Morris P. Fiorina, The Case of the Vanishing Marginals: The Bureaucracy Did It, 71 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 177 (1977).
17. A related, although somewhat more extreme version of this point is that politics
is predominantly symbolic. See JEAN BAUDRILLARD, IN THE SHADOW OF THE
SILENT MAJORITIES (1983) [hereinafter BAUDRILLARD, SILENT MAJORITIES] ; JEAN
BAUDRILLARD, SIMULATIONS (1983); MURRAY EDELMAN, CONSTRUCTING THE
POLITICAL SPECTACLE (1988).
18. Larry M. Bartels, Uninformed Votes: Information Effects in presidential Elections, 40
AM. J. POL. SCI. 194 (1996).
19. See BERNARD R. BERELSON, PAUL F. LAZARSFELD & WILLIAM N. MCPHEE,
VOTING: A STUDY OF OPINION FORMATION IN A PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN (1954); PAUL
F. LAZARSFELD, BERNARD BERELSON & HAZEL GAUDET, THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE (1948).
20. See Donald R. Kinder, Mark D. Peters, Robert P. Abelson & Susan T. Fiske,
presidential Prototypes, 2 POL. BEHAV. 315 (1980); Theresa E. Levitin & Warren E. Miller,
Ideological Interpretations ofpresidential Elections, 73 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 751 (1979).
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leading issues, rather than detailed assessments of particular
decisions;21 in fact, voters often base their decision on the candidates'
perception of problems, rather than their actual or proposed
solutions.22 Finally, if an issue becomes truly salient - if it is
something that voters become truly exercised about - they are likely
to hold those in power responsible for the decision, without making
fine distinctions about who actually made the relevant decision.
The highly attenuated nature of electoral accountability means
that it will be of limited value for the purposes that proponents of
accountability have recommended, that is, arguing against open-ended
delegations by the legislation or in favor of a unitary executive. To
begin with the delegation issue, compelling legislators to make more
policy decisions, rather than deferring such decisions to administrative
agencies, will not mean that these decisions are being more closely
monitored or controlled by voters.23 Even at their most extreme, such
decisions are simply too fine-grained to become factors in an electoral
campaign. Consider, for example, the delegation of authority to the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC).24 This is probably as
broad a delegation as exists in modern government, and it involves a
subject matter about which most Americans are seriously concerned,
since they spend four hours each day watching television. But the
breadth of this delegation, or the specifics of communications policy
that the FCC is authorized to determine in accordance with it, are
unlikely to become issues in an election. Even if the election is highly
contested, and even if the candidates had differing views on this issue,
its salience to the voters is likely to be so low that it would simply
disappear from view. Suppose, moreover, it did become salient;
suppose the FCC licensed a broadcaster who chose programs
recommending Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, for example. Would
the electorate's response be determined by the scope of delegation, or

21. BENJAMIN I. PAGE & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FIFrY YEARS
OF TRENDS IN AMERICANS' POLICY PREFERENCES (1992).
22. WARREN E. MILLER & J. MERRILL SHANKS, THE NEW AMERICAN VOTER 326-413
(1996). Moreover, voters who are interested in proposed solutions can often be satisfied with
unsubstantiated claims because their knowledge of the actual situation is so limited. See
DEREK BOK, THE TROUBLE WITH GOVERNMENT 129-32 (2001).
23. See JERRY L. MASHA W, GREED CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE 152-56 (1997); Jerry L.
Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why A dministrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 81 (1985); Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David
Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775 (1999).
24. The Communications Act of 1 934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-614 (2000). The Act created the
Federal Radio Commission and instructed it to grant broadcast licenses to advance "the
public interest, convenience and necessity." 47 U.S.C. §309(a) (2000). Not only is this
language extremely broad (what does it exclude?) but its few whiffs of operative criteria are
not even relevant. Public interest makes sense, but what is either necessary or convenient
about a radio license? In fact, this language was taken from the Interstate Commerce Act,
where it applied to railroads.
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rather by the candidates' ability to align themselves against the agency
in some general and essentially symbolic manner?
In fact, elected representatives often monitor administrative
agencies quite closely, and hold them responsible for their actions,25
but this has very little to do with their accountability to the electorate.
Rather, it is the result of their hierarchical position, the fact that they
function as agencies' structural superiors in our system. They have this
position because they are the primary policy makers of American
government, and the significance of elections to this function is that
we use elections to select our primary policy makers. Their monitoring
activities are rarely based on any direct accountability to the voters,
but rather are carried out to do their job, to fill their representative
role, and to provide favors to important contributors. And even in a
rare case where their monitoring was based on accountability, it would
not be governed by the breadth of the delegation to the agency
involved, but rather by the amount of constituent ire that particular
agency actions incited, whether that actions were taken pursuant to a
broad or narrow delegation.
Similar problems beset the accountability arguments in support of
a unitary executive, that is, an executive who has direct supervisory
authority over all administrative agencies. In many cases, proponents
of this view argue, on either constitutional or policy grounds, that
the president should be in control of all administrative agencies
because he is elected and therefore accountable to the voters.26 The
sort of control that the president would exercise over a presently
independent agency, however, will rarely have the political salience
that would make a difference in a general election. To be sure, Ronald
Reagan ran on a platform that prominently featured deregulation,
and it is possible that public approval of this position was a factor
in his landslide electoral victory. This was, however, a broadly
stated political position, not the sort of quotidian supervision of
administrative practices that would be facilitated by eliminating
agency independence. In fact, it was the incumbent whom Reagan so
resoundingly defeated, Jimmy Carter, who was actually the most
effective deregulator, before or since. Carter's deregulatory program
was not limited to the quotidian level but in fact involved rather

25. See JAMES R. BOWERS, REGULATING THE REGULATORS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING (1990); MORRIS S.
0GUL, CONGRESS OVERSEES THE BUREAUCRACY (1976); Richard J. Lazarus, The
Neglected Question of Congressional Oversight of EPA, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn
1991, at 205; Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 167 (1984); Matthew D.
McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast ("McNollgast"), Structure and Process,
Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75
VA. L. REV. 431 (1989).

26. See supra note 8 (citing sources).
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sweeping policy changes.27 In addition, most of it was directed toward
independent agencies, which tends to contradict the idea that the
president must possess the removal power in order to exercise control
over these agencies.28 None of this intensive deregulation, however,
seems to have made much of an impression on the electorate. It was
Reagan, who accomplished less but spoke about it more, and certainly
more effectively, who was apparently able to attract whatever votes
this issue was able to produce.
The crucial issue, therefore, once one goes beyond succession, is
representation, not accountability. It is not the process of supervising
government agencies that attracts the electorate's attention but a
candidate's ability to align herself with or against the agency in some
symbolic manner. Thus, if an issue involving some particular action
taken by an administrative agency were to rise to the level of political
salience, it would probably do so in representational terms that had
little to do with the president's actual ability to supervise the agency.
This is essentially what happened in the Willie Horton case that
proved so important in the 1988 election. No one cared whether
Michael Dukakis had granted a broad or narrow delegation of
authority to the Corrections Department to establish a furlough
program. Had he closely monitored the program - an entirely
unrealistic possibility - the political consequences for him would have
been the same. George Bush was able to get political mileage out of
the incident because he connected it to the more essential,
representational function of elections - he claimed it revealed the
sort of person that Dukakis was, and many of the voters believed him.
None of the foregoing arguments are meant to deny that the
president plays an enormously important role in supervising federal

27. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 2493, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978);
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511,
H.R. 4986, 94 Stat. 132 (1980). For descriptions, see MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK,
THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION (1985) (describing the deregulation of trucking);
THOMAS K. MCCRA W, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 259-99 (1984) (describing deregulation
of airline rates).
28. Carter achieved his effects upon independent regulatory agencies by proposing or
supporting legislation or by appointing regulators with well-established perspectives. With
respect to airline deregulation, for example, he appointed Alfred Kahn as chairman of the
Civil Aeronautics Board ("CAB"). Kahn had a well-developed theory about rate regulation,
which he had expressed in print, see ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION
(1970), as well as a proven track record as an effective and deregulation-oriented
administrator at the New York Public Service Commission. See MCCRAW supra note 27, at
226-59. There was not the slightest possibility that he would not adopt the vigorous
deregulatory program that Carter had in mind, and after Carter appointed another
deregulator, Elizabeth Bailey, to the CAB, see id. at 273, there was little likelihood that he
would not succeed in implementing it. The changes that he instituted were soon extended,
and made permanent, by the Airline Deregulation Act. When Kahn left the CAB for
another (non-independent) administrative post, Carter wrote to him that he had "presented
my Administration with one of its great success stories." Id. at 295.
,
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agencies. While he does not enjoy the absolute authority over
executive agencies that the Constitution seems to contemplate, he
certainly takes an active role, and often achieves the results he desires.
Similarly, he does not suffer from the lack of authority over
independent agencies that proponents of the unitary presidency
sometimes suggest, and he frequently achieves his desired results in
this case as well.29 But, as with legislative oversight, the president
achieves these results in his capacity as the structural superior of
executive agencies, and as the person who appoints the leaders of both
executive and independent agencies.30 He exercises this control
because it is his job, because he has a set of beliefs that he wants to
implement, and sometimes because he wants to do favors for large
contributors. Thus, control over the bureaucracy is exercised by the
president according to the succession principle, that is, his accession to
the job through an election, and according to the representation
principle, that is, the views that enabled him to be elected, but not
according to the electoral accountability principle. This control is
simply to fine-grained, too recondite, to produce an impact on the
voters. There may be good reasons why the president should be in
direct control of all federal agencies, but his accountability to the
voters is not one of them.
B.

State Officials and Autonomy ofAction:
The Federalism Argument

A third representation-related use of accountability in
contemporary political and legal scholarship is the claim that elected
state officials, because they are accountable to the people, should not
be subject to policy control by the federal government. This is, of
course, an argument in favor of federalism, and it is part of the general
upsurge in enthusiasm for that idea on the part of both the Supreme
Court31 and the scholarly community.32 Federalism can be defined as a

29. See JAMES G. BENZE, JR., PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND MANAGEMENT
TECHNIQUES: THE CARTER AND REAGAN ADMINISTRATIONS IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE (1987); RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN
PRESIDENTS; THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN (1990);
RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP WITH
REFLECTIONS ON JOHNSON AND NIXON (2d ed. 1976) (1964); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE
POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH (1993);
DAVID M. WELBORN, GOVERNANCE OF FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES (1977); Elena
Kagan, presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001); Paul R. Verkuil,
Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 943 (1980).
30. The president does not appoint the entire board of multi-member independent
agencies, at least at first, but he typically has the authority to appoint the Chair.
31. For recent federalism decisions by the Court, see, for example, United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (federal statute criminalizing gender-motivated violence
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political system where subsidiary units of the nation exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over some set of issues, that is, where there are some types
of decisions that are reserved to the subsidiary governmental units,
and that the central government may not displace or countermand.33
This structure is often described by saying that the subsidiary units
possess rights against the central government.
Arguments for federalism can be either formal, that is, based on an
interpretation of the Constitution,34 or functional, that is, based on
pragmatic considerations that emerge from concerns about fair or
effective governance.35 The accountability of state elected officials is a
functional argument for federalism, and its most direct embodiments
are the anti-commandeering cases such as Printz v. United States36 and
New York v. United States.37 Anticommandeering is the idea that state
officials, being accountable to their constituents, should retain
exclusive jurisdiction over the issues on which their constituents will

exceeds federal Commerce Clause authority); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)
(federal requirement that local law enforcement officers perform background checks on gun
purchasers commandeers state officials in violation of Constitution's federalism provisions);
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (extension of federal jurisdiction to
suits against states to enforce duties under Indian gaming law violates Eleventh
Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (federal statute criminalizing gun
possession near schools exceeds federal Commerce Clause authority); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (federal statute requiring states to develop plans for disposal of
radioactive waste commandeers state officials in violation of federalism provisions); and
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (federal age discrimination statute must be
interpreted as inapplicable to state officials in order to avoid conflict with federal
provisions).
32. For recent scholarship favoring federalism, apart from accountability-related
arguments, see supra note 9. See also Ann Althouse, Enforcing Federalism After United
States v. Lopez, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 793 (1996); Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back
into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951 (2001); Richard A. Epstein,
The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1987); Stephen Gardbaum,
Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 795 (1996); Marci A. Hamilton, Why
Federalism Must Be Enforced: A Response to Professor Kramer, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1069
(2001); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a
Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1988); Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459 (2001).
33. See WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE (1964);
Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Political Economy of Federalism, in
PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE: A HANDBOOK 73 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997);
William H. Riker, Federalism, in HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE: GOVERNMENTAL
INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES 93 (Fred I. Greenstein & Nelson w. Polsby eds., 1975).
34. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of
Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75 (2001); Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper"
Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation ofthe Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J.
267 (1993).
35. See, e.g., Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of
Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. Cf. REV. 341; Merritt, supra note 32.
36. 521U.S. 898 (1997).
37. 505U.S. 144 (1992).
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judge them.38 For the federal government to commandeer them, to
compel them to implement federal statutes, undermines them unfairly
because their constituents may hold them accountable for decisions
that were forced upon them. As Justice Scalia said in Printz, the
Constitution "contemplates that a State's government will represent
and remain accountable to its own citizens. "39 A secondary concern of
this accountability argument is for the voters, who will be misled by
federal commandeering and may then fail to hold their officials
accountable for matters that these officials decide on their own.40
It is important, in assessing this argument, to distinguish between
federalism and decentralization.41 The idea of decentralization plays
an important role in arguments for accountability based on devolution
to local authorities,42 but federalism is a different notion. As stated,
federalism grants subsidiary units a final say in certain areas; that is, it
grants these governments definitive rights against the center.
Decentralization, in contrast, is a managerial strategy by which a
centralized regime can achieve the results it desires in a more effective
manner.43 The effectiveness of any decisionmaking unit depends on a
variety of factors, including the information available to it, the quality
38. See Caminker, supra note 9; Jackson, supra note 9; Merritt, supra note 9; Saikrishna
Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957 (1993); Richard B. Stewart,
Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of
National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977).
39. 521 U.S. at 920.
40. Cf Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000) (arguing that electoral accountability serves as
an alternative to judicial enforcement of federalism); La Pierre, supra note 9 (same). When
this argument is framed in terms of state voters' ability to protect their state from unwanted
federal intrusions, it is not very convincing, for reasons stated above. When the argument is
framed in terms of state officials' ability to do so, it is more plausible. The latter position is
the basis of the classic legal process school statements of this idea. See JESSE H. CHOPER,
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITTCAL PROCESS: A FuNCTIONAL
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 192-93 (1980); Herbert
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition
and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
41. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND
THE MODERN STATE: How THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS 180-88 (1998);
Akhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons for the Old World, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 483
(1991); Richard Briffault, "What About the 'Ism'? " Normative and Formal Concerns in
Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303 (1994) [hereinafter Briffault,
Contemporary Federalism]; Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on
a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994).
42. See infra Part II.A.
43. For discussions of decentralization from a managerial perspective, see PETER M.
BLAU & W. RICHARD SCOTT, FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH
(1962); MANFRED KOCHEN & KARL W. DEUTSCH, DECENTRALIZATION: SKETCHES
TOWARD A RATIONAL THEORY (1980); WALTER T. MORRIS, DECENTRALIZATION IN
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (1968); and Kenneth J. Arrow & Leonid Hurwicz, Decentralization
and Computation in Resource Allocation, in ESSAYS IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS: A
VOLUME IN HONOR OF HAROLD HOTELLING 34 (Ralph w. Pfouts ed., 1960).
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of its personnel, its level of control over its subordinates, and its
prestige among those who must follow its commands. These factors
sometimes suggest that the most effective decisions will be made by
the central government, and sometimes suggest that it will be made by
a geographical subdivision. A central government can achieve
uniformity and may be able to command greater resources and
prestige. A subdivision may be able to gather information more
effectively, to control street-level employees, and to respond to
circumstances that are specific to its locality. The choice between these
two alternative strategies, that is, the particular allocation of
responsibility within the overall structure, is determined by the
effectiveness of each strategy in achieving the desired result. But it is
the central government that identifies this result in a decentralization
strategy, and thus defines the criteria for success or failure. And it is
the central government that decides how decisionmaking authority
will be divided between itself and the geographical subdivisions and
when that allocation will be changed.
With this distinction in mind, the idea that federalism is partially
justified by the need to secure the accountability of elected state
officials can be assessed. The first difficulty with it is that it depends
on the same unrealistic beliefs about elections that were discussed
with respect to the non-delegation and unitary executive ideas. It
assumes that voters can distinguish between state and federal areas
of jurisdiction as long as the federal government is not allowed to
intrude upon the state's prerogatives. This is not an easy thing to
do, however, because federal and state responsibility overlap in
so many areas of governance.44 Consumer sales practices, food
quality, securities offerings, worker safety, civil rights, environmental
protection, agriculture, mining, and numerous other areas are
regulated by the federal government under the Interstate Commerce
Clause, banks are chartered under the Money Clause, roads are built
under the national defense power. Most of these functions are
decentralized within the federal government, which means that there
are regional, state or local offices carrying out the federal functions.
States regulate the same areas, charter banks and build roads as part
of their general police power. The result is a complex pattern of
overlapping jurisdiction. Once again, the matter is too technical, too

44. See DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES (3d
ed. 1984) (hereinafter ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM]; DANIEL J. ELAZAR, EXPLORING
FEDERALISM (1987) (hereinafter ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM]; W. BROOKE
GRAVES, AMERICAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS: THEIR ORIGINS, HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT, AND CURRENT STATUS (1964); MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN
SYSTEM (1966); RICHARD H. LEACH, AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1970); Morton Grodzins,
The Federal System, in AMERICAN FEDERALISM IN PERSPECTIVE 256 (Aaron Wildavsky
ed., 1967). Grodzins proposes the image of a marble cake to describe the way state and
federal authority are mixed together. See GRODZINS, supra, at 60-88.
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fine-grained to be salient to voters, except under the most
extraordinary circumstances.
But the accountability argument for federalism indulges in an even
greater level of implausibility than this. Having assumed that the
average voter can distinguish between federal and state authority,
despite all these overlapping jurisdictions, it then assumes that the
voters will be fooled when the federal government gives orders to
state officials in one of these areas. In other words, these amazingly
sophisticated voters - who understand that some federally insured
banks are chartered and supervised by the state while others are
chartered and supervised by the Treasury Department, or that the
quality of the food served in a restaurant is monitored by state
officials, but the quality of the packaged food sold at the counter is
monitored by federal officials - are unable to understand that the
federal government is compelling the state to take certain actions.
Moreover, the elected officials who are so compelled are absolutely
unable to explain this fact to these sophisticated voters. This melange
of contradictory arguments gives rise to the suspicion that
accountability is a post hoc rationalization invoked by proponents of
federalism because of its current cachet.
Nor does this intricate overlap of jurisdiction account for the
full complexity of federal-state relations. The federal government
plays an active role in many areas that are primarily regulated by
the states, such as education, local policing, welfare, public housing,
and health, by providing monetary aid to the states and attaching
conditions to the grants.45 In other areas, or sometimes the same
areas, it delegates federal regulatory authority to state administrative
agencies, provided that those agencies comply with federal standards.
These mechanisms, generally described as cooperative federalism,46
are a means of simultaneously extending the reach of federal authority
and decentralizing its management to state-level institutions. In
theory, they do not violate the rights of states because state
acceptance of the funds, or of federal authority, is voluntary. The
Supreme Court upheld the validity of conditional funding programs in

45. For an exploration of the federalism concerns that this practice raises, see Lynn A.
Baker, Conditional Federal Spending and States' Rights, 574 ANNALS 104 (2001); Lynn A.
Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its
Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J.
459 (2003); and Baker, supra note 32.
46. See ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM, supra note 44; ELAZAR, EXPLORING
FEDERALISM, supra note 44; GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note 44.
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that conclusion by

Cooperative federalism, like overlapping jurisdiction, tends to
obscure any separation between state and federal authority, thus
demanding even more spectacular levels of sophistication from voters
if they are to hold state officials accountable within their area of sole
authority. In addition, it tends to undermine the idea that such areas
of sole authority exist. The entire theory of American government is
one of checks and balances, overlapping authority, legally compelled
cooperation, and legally authorized dispute. This dynamic tension
between the state and federal governments is a pervasive feature of
American government, and many proponents of federalism argue that
it is desirable, as a means of diffusing power and securing liberty.49
Electoral accountability is simply too attenuated to justify some
complex determination like the boundaries of federal-state relations,
just as it is too attenuated to justify nondelegation or a unitary chief
executive.
A third difficulty with the accountability argument for federalism,
apart from the existence of overlapping jurisdictions and cooperative
governance, is that its essential claim tends to be refuted by the
interaction between state and local government. The American people
are governed by a vast array of local authorities - villages, towns,
cities, counties, and special purpose districts. According to long and
essentially unchallenged doctrine, these authorities have no
constitutional status of their own; they are creatures of the state.50

47. 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (condition that states could only receive highway funds if they
prohibited anyone below the age of 21 from buying alcohol does not violate Constitution's
federalism provisions).
48. 537 U. S. 129 (2003) (condition that states could only participate in federally funded
highway safety program if they kept the accident reports generated pursuant to that program
confidential does not violate Constitution's federalism provisions). The decision was not
only unanimous, but was written by Justice Thomas.
49. Charles J. Cooper, Limited Government and Individual Liberty: The Ninth
Amendment's Forgotten Lessons, 4 J.L. & POL. 63 (1987); Kaden, supra note 9; Jonathan R.
Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation:
Toward a Public Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265 (1990); Robert F.
Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981
SUP. Cr. REV. 81; Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People's A ffection: Federalism's
Forgotten Marketplace, 56 V AND. L. REV. 329 (2003).
50. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907). For subsequent
reaffirmations, see Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U. S. 60, 70-72 (1978); Sailors v. Bd. of
Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 108 (1967); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964); Williams v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36 (1933); and City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S 182
(1923). See generally JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911); ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM, supra note 44, at 202--08;
Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980). Indeed, it might
be regarded as a violation of the Constitution, specifically its federalism provisions, for the
federal government to intrude in the relationship between a state and its localities.
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Moreover, within states, the general legal principle that controls state
local relations is Dillon's rule, which is that local governments possess
only those powers that have been granted them by state authorities.51
Some state constitutions provide certain forms of autonomy for local
jurisdictions, but others do not, and there is certainly no uniform
pattern.52 Thus, state governments are authorized, by both the federal
Constitution and their own constitutions, to commandeer local
officials, that is, to use these employees of the state's creatures to carry
out state programs. The pattern, moreover, is enormously complex.
Even those sophisticated voters who can disentangle the strands of
federal-state relations may have difficulty knowing precisely where
state initiatives end and local ones begin. But the absolute subjugation
of some local governments to state authority and the high level of
incomprehension regarding the scope of autonomy possessed by
others do not appear to have prevented American cities and towns
from developing vigorous political scenes with intense competition for
electoral office. Elections are still used to determine succession, voters
still choose candidates to represent them, and candidates are still held
accountable on a few salient issues. The fact that local officials are
regularly compelled to implement state programs, to an extent that
goes beyond anything in federal-state relations, does not seem to
interfere at all with the electoral process for these officials.
A fourth and final point, and in a sense the most important, is that
the invocation of accountability on behalf of state officials assumes the
very point at issue in the federalism debate, namely, the proper
balance between state and federal authority. After all, citizens vote for
federal officials as well as state officials, and the type of officials for
whom they vote at the state and federal levels is generally analogous.
Which of these sets of elections provides more accountability in a
situation where the authority to decide is a matter of debate? Granting
authority to the state allows the state voters to control the issue, but it
simultaneously denies a voice to voters in the other states. Whether
those out-of-state voters should be given a voice - whether the
decisionmaker should be accountable to them in addition to the in
state voters - is precisely the issue at stake in the federalism debate.
The general idea of electoral accountability, which can be invoked on
each side, does nothing to resolve the issue, even assuming that it is an

51. See GORDON L. CLARK, JUDGES AND THE CITIES: INTERPRETING LOCAL
AUTONOMY 70 (1985); Clayton P. Gillette, The Exercise of Trumps by Decentralized
Governments, 83 VA. L. REV. 1347, 1363-65 (1997); Clayton P. Gillette, In Panial Praise of
Dillon 's Rule, or, Can Public Choice Theory Justify Local Government Law?, 67 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 959 (1991).
52. Briffault, Contemporary Federalism, supra note 41; Richard Briffault, Our
Localism: Part I - The Structure of Local Government, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1990)
[hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism].
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operative principle with respect to these relatively recondite and
complex matters.
Consider two examples. A large portion of the State of Colorado
consists of National Forest land, with valuable stands of timber. The
majority of voters in Colorado, let us assume, would like to grant
licenses to loggers so that this timber can be harvested - to use the
polite term for cutting - thereby creating jobs, bolstering the state's
economy, and generating tax revenue. The majority of voters in
Connecticut, let us also assume, regard the National Forests as
wilderness, not timber land, and would prefer that they be left
undisturbed. The Colorado voters could argue that the National
Forest land is their land, within their state, and that if the people of
Connecticut want wilderness, they can preserve their own; with a
lower per capita income than Connecticut, their state needs the jobs
and the tax revenue. Colorado voters want decisions about the
National Forests made by elected officials whom they alone choose
and who, in theory, are accountable only to them. The Connecticut
voters could respond that their state suffers from a lack of spectacular
scenery, and that Colorado's represents a valuable treasure that
belongs to all Americans. If Colorado residents want higher paying
jobs, they are free to move to Connecticut. Connecticut residents want
the decision about the National Forests made by elected officials at
the federal level, who are, collectively, chosen by all Americans
including themselves. How can this dispute be resolved without some
preliminary determination on the merits of these two positions?53 How
can the concept of accountability be of assistance when it can be so
readily invoked on either side?
Now consider gun control, the substantive issue in both Printz and
United States v. Lopez.54 The voters in Colorado, let us assume, want

53. Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to
the-Bottom " Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1233
(1992) argues that states or localities are as likely to protect the environment as the federal
government. This position has of course been challenged. See William W. Buzbee,
Brownfields, Environmental Federalism, and Institutional Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 27-46 (1997); Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard
Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is it "To the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997); Peter P.
Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition
Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 67, 91-94 (1996). The
point here, however, is that merely that the federal government and a particular state
government are likely to have different policy positions, a point that seems irrefutable since
state government positions vary, and federal policy that agrees with one must disagree with
the others. Given these differences, the scope of the electorate is clearly of critical
importance to the idea that elections achieve accountability. Federalism cannot solve this
problem. It simply offers one particular solution, empowering some voters and
disenfranchising others.
54. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Lopez struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,
which criminalized possession of a gun within 1,000 feet of a school, on commerce clause
grounds. See Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674 (1995).

August 2005]

The Myth of Accountability

2091

lenient gun control laws and therefore want the issue of gun control
decided by people whom they choose and, again in theory, are
accountable to them. They realize that this could lead to more
tragedies like Columbine, but they point out that all the Columbine
victims were Coloradans, and that they are willing to accept the risk in
order to retain their freedom to own guns. The voters in Connecticut,
again by assumption, want to have a voice in the decision about gun
use in Colorado and therefore want this decision made at the federal
level.ss They assert that Columbine traumatized all Americans and
made their own children feel less safe in school. Moreover, the
Coloradan children who died at Columbine, and who will die if there
are future incidents of this sort in Colorado, are Americans, after all,
and although Colorado voters do not want to protect them, they are
nonetheless deserving of protection. Perhaps the case for federal
control is stronger with respect to National Forests than with respect
to gun control, although the gun control debate is essentially similar in
structure to the debate over slavery, which plunged the United States
into a civil war. Some people will think differently about the two
issues, some will think that both should be a matter for the states, and
some will think both should be determined on the federal level. But
this sort of conflict will be present in virtually every federalism issue.
There is no point on which accountability concerns lie only on one
side of the debate, and there is thus very little insight to be gained
from invoking them, even if they were plausibly involved.
C.

What Lies Beneath

As suggested at the outset, the accountability arguments for non
delegation and a unitary executive, although they both recommend
increased authority for federal elected officials, are not consistent with
each other. The accountability argument for federalism, which
recommends invalidation of statutes enacted by federal elected
officials in order to protect the jurisdiction of state elected officials, is
inconsistent with both. Taken together, these arguments favor
increased authority for Congress, the president, and state officials,
three groups that regularly compete with each over about allocations
of authority. The conflicts and inconsistencies among these various
electoral accountability arguments suggest that accountability is not a
coherent concept but a fashionable term that judges and scholars are

55. They may also assert that lenient gun laws in Colorado will make it easier for people
to bring guns into Connecticut, but let us assume, since this is a hypothetical, that this claim
can be proven false, so that Connecticut citizens have a pragmatic claim in one case (we
want to see the trees) and a symbolic or moral claim in the other (the gun-toting mayhem in
Colorado upsets us).
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invoking whenever they have a position which favors elected officials
in some way.
If that were true, it would certainly count against the coherence of
accountability as a concept, and it might compel one to choose
between the rival versions of this concept in specific situations, but it
would not, by itself, suggest that all these uses of accountability are ill
advised. It might be the case, for example, that the nondelegation and
federalism arguments are weak but that the unitary executive
argument stands on a firm foundation and should not be criticized
because it conflicts with unconvincing arguments that use the same
terminology. In fact, the problem with accountability arguments is
more severe. Despite their differing recommendations, electoral
accountability arguments are united by a similar vision, a vision that is
unacknowledged but that explains why such questionable arguments
possess so much contemporary appeal. That vision is a pre-analytic
and essentially unrealistic hostility to the government we actually
possess - the modern bureaucratic or administrative state.
Let us try to imagine a situation where all three recommendations
were accepted, where legislators did not delegate policy decisions,
where the president was in direct control of the executive branch, and
where the states were largely free of federal interference. What would
such a situation look like? Well, it might just look like American
government in the 1820s. At that time, indeed, Congress did not
delegate extensive authority to executive officials, there were no
independent agencies, and there were very few federal incursions on
state authority.56 As modem people, beset by the infinitely complex
problems of a mass society, look back upon that time, at least if they
are white, it seems simpler, less troubled, and infinitely more
appealing. In addition, for Americans, pre-modem government is
proximate to the founding of our nation and thus to what we think of
as the source of our political legitimacy. Most important of all, there
was virtually no administrative governance in the United States.57 Our
attitudes about this mode of governance are generally so negative the term bureaucracy itself is so close to an imprecation - that any
56. See generally GEORGE DANGERFIELD, THE ERA OF GOOD FEELINGS (1952);
ROBERT V. REMINI, THE JACKSONIAN ERA (1989); GLYNDON G. VAN DEUSEN, THE
JACKSONIAN ERA 1828-1848 (1959); GLYNDON G. VAN DEUSEN, THE RISE AND DECLINE
OF JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY (1970).
57. With respect to the development of the administrative state in the United States, see
RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, YANKEE LEVIATHAN: THE ORIGINS OF CENTRAL STATE
AUTHORITY IN AMERICA, 1 859-1877 (1990); HAROLD U. FAULKNER, THE DECLINE OF
LAISSEZ FAIRE, 1897-1917 (1951); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN
BUREAUCRACY, 1830-1900 (1982); JOHN A. ROHR, TO RUN A CONSTITUTION: THE
LEGffiMACY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1986); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A
NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES,
1877-1920 (1982); and CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION:
RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 12-31 (1990).
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era where bureaucracy did not exist seems to possess an ineffable
charm.58
The nondelegation doctrine is antibureaucratic in its insistence that
legislators make all the basic policy decisions in the modern state.
Bureaucracy was assimilated into the three-branch model that
provides an organizing principle for the Constitution59 and that serves
as our prevailing metaphor for governmental structure, by treating it
as part of the executive.6() This means, according to the traditional
allocation of responsibility to the three branches, that the bureaucracy,
as a whole, is supposed to implement the laws that the legislature
passes. If one elevates this metaphor into obligatory doctrine - a
position for which there is little historical justification61 - one comes

58. For negative depictions of bureaucracy, see MICHAEL BARZELAY, BREAKING
THROUGH BUREAUCRACY (1992) (bureaucracy creates rigid, unimaginative governance);
F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (15th ed. 1994) (bureaucracy destroys personal
freedom); PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: HOW LAW IS
SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1994) (bureaucracy suppresses beneficial public and private
initiatives); HENRY JACOBY, THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF THE WORLD (Eveline L. Kanes
trans., 1973) (bureaucracy displaces diversity of culture); LEON TROTSKY, THE
REVOLUTION BETRAYED: WHAT Is THE SOVIET UNION AND WHERE IS IT GOING? (Max
Eastman trans., 1937) (bureaucracy destroys genuine Communism); and David Luban et al.,
Moral Responsibility in an Age of Bureaucracy, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2348 (1992) (bureaucracy
breeds fascism).
59. For the origin of the three branch metaphor, see ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 264-72
(T.A. Sinclair trans., Penguin Books 1981); JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT 82-84 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., Liberal Arts Press 1952) (1690);
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 156-66 (Anne Cobler et al. eds. & trans.,
Cambridge University Press 1989) (1748); and M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS (1967) (discussing English Civil War writers).
60. On the incorporation of the metaphor into the U.S. Constitution, see W.B. GWYN,
THE MEANING OF SEPARATION OF POWERS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DOCTRINE FROM ITS
ORIGIN TO THE ADOPTION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1965) and PAUL
MERRILL SPURLIN, MONTESQUIEU IN AMERICA 1760-1801 (1940).
61. All that can be said is that the Framers used the three branch model as a heuristic
for conceptualizing the structure of government. There is no indication that they intended to
give that heuristic any legal force beyond the structural provisions that were explicitly
adopted. At the time the Constitution was being drafted, several states, including Virginia
and Pennsylvania, had followed the more radical Civil War writers and enacted constitutions
that specifically declared the three branches of government to be entirely separate. Bruce A.
Ackerman, Liberating Abstraction, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 317 (1992); Gerhard Casper, An
Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV.
209 (1989); Louis Fisher, The Allocation of Powers: The Framers' Intent, in SEPARATION OF
POWERS IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 19 (Barbara B. Knight ed., 1989). The
authors of the federal Constitution were certainly aware of these provisions, but they were
more immediately concerned about the ineffectiveness of the central government than about
its potential threat to liberty and never seriously considered a provision of this sort. Indeed,
the First Congress, in which many of them sat, rejected a separation of powers amendment
when James Madison, apparently experiencing regrets about his draftsmanship, proposed
it together with the Bill of Rights. See 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 202 (Charles F.
Hobson et al. eds., 1984); see also EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT
IT MEANS TODAY 33-44 (1957); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to The Original Intentions
in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 27172 ( 1988).
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to the conclusion that administrative agencies are not supposed to
enact laws but only enforce those laws that have been enacted by the
legislature. By parallel reasoning, of course, one could also conclude
that agencies are not supposed to adjudicate the legal status of
individuals.
These positions have been rendered obsolete by the advent of the
administrative state; to take them seriously would be to reverse an
entire century of political developments and seriously disrupt our
political system.62 In fact, administrative agencies make the majority of
our rules and carry out the majority of our adjudications.63 They
constitute the basic, operational structure of modern government, and
this role necessarily involves a considerable amount of policymaking.
The president and his immediate staff, Congress, and the federal
courts function mainly to control and direct the bureaucracy, rather
than performing basic governmental operations.64 They make policy in
certain areas, and when they do so, that policy usually prevails, but
they could not possibly make all the policy-level decisions that modern
government requires.
Proponents of the nondelegation doctrine, fully aware of the
irreversibility of administrative government, often insist that their
recommendations would not necessarily cause a reduction in the scale
of the administrative state, that Congress could make all the basic
policy decisions if its members only worked harder, were better
informed, and possessed more political resolve.65 But of course, the
nondelegation doctrine would lead to a massive retrenchment of
administrative government, beyond anything that any mainstream
politician has proposed. For Congress to increase its policymaking
activities by such a vast amount would entail vast political costs, and
vast monetary costs in staff resources.66 When costs go up, and the
62. Michael Asirnow, When the Curtain Falls: Separation of Functions in the Federal
Administrative Agencies, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 759 (1981): Paul Gewirtz, Realism in Separation
of Powers Thinking, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 343 (1989); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of
Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Founh Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV .
573 (1984); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421
(1987); Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, The Rule of Law and the Idea of
Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301 (1989).
63. See generally CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY (1994); JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC
JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS (1983).
64. Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 369 (1989).
65. See 1-3 FREDERICK AUGUST VON HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY
(1973-79); LOWI, supra note 7; SCHOENBROD, supra note 7; Gary Lawson, Delegation and
Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327 (2002); Lawson, supra note 7.
66. The result of this expenditure, moreover, would be the creation of a vast staff
operation, inevitably organized along bureaucratic lines that would be no more accountable
to the elected representatives than existing agencies.
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scale of the producer's basic operation does not change, the quantity
of production will inevitably decline. For these reasons, enforcing the
nondelegation doctrine is politically unrealistic, as the federal courts
have long recognized67 and the Supreme Court has recently
reconfirmed.68 Academic writing urging its enforcement is essentially
an expression of hostility toward the administrative state.
Proposals for a unitary presidency are less openly hostile to the
administrative state but ultimately rest on a similar instinct. These
proposals, while acknowledging the crucial role that agencies play in
modern government, insist that these agencies must be controlled by
the president, as an elected and presumably accountable official. But
there is no particular reason why Congress, as our primary policy
maker, cannot deploy the device of independence that the
Constitution deploys for the judiciary.69 The mere fact that the
president cannot remove the top political appointees, which is the
hallmark of independence, does not mean that the agency is out of
control. A so-called independent agency is generally subject to
Congressional and judicial control to the exact same extent as an
executive agency. It is equally subject to control by private parties,
both through the legally established mechanisms of the Administrative
Procedure Act,70 and through the informal contacts that one court
described as the "bread and butter" of the administrative process.71 It
is even subject to control by the president, through his appointment of
the Chair and through his influence as the most important person in
the government.72 The idea that an agency is out of control simply

67. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.
Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971). The only statute that was ever struck down on
nondelegation grounds was the National Industrial Recovery Act. See A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388 (1935). Not only were these decisions handed down by a Court whose decisions are no
longer regarded as precedents, but the NIRA was atypical in that it delegated extensive
governance authority to private parties as well as executive officials.
68. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (rejecting nondelegation
challenge to Clean Air Act's requirement that EPA set air quality standards without regard
to costs).
69. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The president and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994); Edward Rubin, Independence as a Governance Mechanism, in
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 56
(Stephen Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002).
70. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 4301 , 5355, 5372, 7521 (2000). The statute,
as amended, incorporates the Freedom of Information Act, see id. § 552, which enables
private parties to exercise control by monitoring based on information.
71. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
72. See WELBORN, supra note 29; Kagan, supra note 29; Verkuil, supra note 29.
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because it is not subject to the direct commands of the chief executive
betrays a underlying fearfulness of the administrative process.73
Finally, federalism arguments often possess an equally anti
administrative tone. It is true that shifting authority from the federal
government to the states often means shifting authority from a federal
to a state administrative agency.74 But the growth of administrative
government is generally connected to the nationalization process, a
connection that is unambiguously true in unitary regimes.75 In the
United States, regulation tends to be associated with federal
incursions into state affairs, and arguments for state autonomy are
often couched in quasi-deregulatory terms.
There are at least three reasons for the association between
regulation and the federal government. First, in federalism-re!ated
conflicts between the federal government and the states, the conflict
usually manifests itself when the federal government attempts
to regulate either the state itself76 or some entity within the state.77
To be sure, other federalism cases involve federal legislation
establishing court-enforced rights or punishments,78 but regulatory

73. There are also arguments for a unitary executive based on textual or structural
arguments about the president's possession of all executive power. See Miller, supra note 8.
These are not as anti-administrative in tone, but they do not depend on the idea of
accountability and are thus beyond the scope of this discussion.
74. See, e.g. , Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (2000) (shifting administration of welfare payments from federal to
state agencies, and establishing criteria for monitoring state agencies).
75. See, e.g., ERNEST BARKER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICES IN WESTERN
EUROPE 1660-1930 (1966); HOWARD G. BROWN, WAR, REVOLUTION, AND THE
BUREAUCRATIC STATE (1995); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN
CHANGING SOCIETIES (1968); GIANFRANCO POGGI, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN
STATE (1978); THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL STATES IN WESTERN EUROPE (Charles Tilly
ed., 1975); EUGEN WEBER, PEASANTS INTO FRENCHMEN: THE MODERNIZATION OF
RURAL FRANCE, 1870-1914 (1976).
76. See, e.g. , Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (effort to
apply federal labor regulation regarding disabled workers to state employees struck down on
federalism grounds); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (effort to regulate
disposal of radioactive waste by compelling states to create facilities within their borders
struck down on federalism grounds); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (effort to
apply federal labor regulation involving retirement age to state judges rejected by
interpreting statute in light of federalist principles); Nat'! League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976) (effort to apply federal labor regulation involving minimum wages to state
employees struck down on federalism grounds).
77. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001)
(effort to regulate disruption of water used by migratory birds rejected by interpreting
statute in light of federalism principles); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (effort
to regulate ages at which children could be employed in a factory struck down on federalism
grounds).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (statute granting victims of
gender-oriented crime the right to sue for money damages struck down on federalism
grounds); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (statute requiring courts to strike
down infringements on free exercise unless supported by a compelling state interest struck
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cases predominate. Second, while the federal government does not
necessarily take the lead in developing administrative programs,79 it
generally finds itself in the role of imposing regulations on the less
progressive states, and often on the majority of states. Given the
variations in state adoption of regulatory programs, there will almost
always be some states that have not acted by the time the federal
legislation passes.80 The impact of the legislation on these states will be
more salient than its lack of impact on the states that have already
enacted similar legislation.81 Third, and closely related to the second,
many states are simply too small to develop and operate the kinds
of regulatory programs that the federal government imposes. Some
thirty American states have fewer than five million people. Program
drafting and design costs tend to be somewhat constant, rather than
varying with scale, and these states, particularly given the American
reluctance to tax, will often find themselves unable to initiate
regulation on their own.
To summarize, accountability arguments for nondelegation, a
unitary executive, and federalism may seem to be inconsistent because
these arguments recommend increased authority for groups of elected
officials who may be in conflict with each other. But all these
arguments possess an underlying unity in their hostility to modem
administrative government. The conflict among their beneficiaries can
be resolved if all three groups of elected officials gain power at the
expense of the bureaucracy. Nondelegation can be viewed as a
transfer of authority from the bureaucracy to Congress, a unitary
executive can be viewed as a transfer of authority from independent
agencies to the president, and federalism can be viewed as a transfer
of authority from federal administrators to elected state officials.
What underlies accountability arguments for in these three areas,
therefore, is a nostalgic desire for the days when elected officials were
the primary governmental actors, and administrative agencies were
nascent or, even better, nonexistent. This is an unrealistic and indeed
irrational impulse, however. Deregulation is certainly possible in
certain areas, but modern government cannot function without
extensive reliance on administrative agencies. Given the scale and

down on federalism grounds); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (criminal law
against possession of firearms near school struck down on federalism grounds).
79. On the origins of regulatory commissions, see MCCRAW, supra note 27, at 17-44
(1984) (describing Massachusetts Board of Railroad Commissioners, a precursor of the
Interstate Commerce Commission).
80. See Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard States: Federalism and Constitutional
Rights, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1745 (2004) (discussing judicial reaction to this phenomenon).
81. Indeed, sometimes there will be no impact at all on the more regulation-oriented
states, because the federal statute will defer to states that have already adopted an
equivalent or higher level of regulation.
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complexity of the tasks to be accomplished, moreover, any effort to
decrease such reliance by transferring authority away from agencies
will merely lead to the creation of new bureaucratic structures in
Congress, the White House, state government, or any other recipient
of such authority, without altering the essential reality of the modern
administrative state.
II.

ACCOUNTABILITY AND DEVOLUTION

The second major category of accountability arguments that
appear in modern political science and legal scholarship is that related
to the devolution of authority from the central government to local
institutions or to private persons. These arguments can also be divided
into two separate sub-categories, the first focusing more on politics,
and the second focusing on the enforcement process. The political
one, sometimes identified with the idea of federalism and sometimes
with the idea of participatory democracy, argues that local institutions
are more accountable to the people than centralized ones and that
devolution of power to such institutions will therefore improve the
quality of government. The enforcement subcategory argues that
private institutions and individuals can be accountable for their own
behavior, and that the government's efforts to enforce the law should
allow people to play an active role. Again, these two arguments will be
considered in turn.
A.

Political Devolution: Federalism, Decentralization, and
Participatory Democracy

Accountability arguments for the devolution of authority from the
central government to localities are based on the idea that a political
entity that governs a small group of people can be more readily
controlled by those people than one that governs a larger group. In
other words, small governmental units are more accountable to their
constituents.82 Implicit in this claim are at least three different
thoughts. First, a government is more accountable to those it governs
if it is small, because it will need to be more attentive to the concerns
of its constituency. Second, a government is more accountable to those
it governs if the governed group is small, because the members of this
group can communicate more readily with each other, and more
82. See HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1996); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS:
How HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE,
AND LAND-USE POLICIES (2001); Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and
the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14
YALE L. & POL'Y. 23 (1996); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders'
Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1491-1511 (1987); Deborah Jones Merritt, supra note 32.
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readily organize political action. Third, a government is more
accountable to those it governs if its decisionmakers are physically
closer to those whom it governs, because such proximity causes the
government to be more attentive and facilitates communication from
the constituency.
These arguments, it should be noted, are distinct from the
arguments about the accountability of elected officials that were
discussed in the previous section. They would apply even if the central
government were controlled by elected officials and, indeed, even if
the local government were not. The central government's lack of
accountability, according to this view, comes from its size, the
tremendous physical and organizational distance that separates the
leaders of continent-wide nation of three hundred million people from
any of its citizens. The asserted accountability of local officials is not
necessarily based on elections but can result from the familiarity of the
officials with their constituents and their vulnerability to personal
influence or organized protests by those constituents. While it might
be argued that an elected local government is more accountable than a
non-elected one, the devolution argument allows for other forms of
accountability that function on the local level.
It should also be noted that devolution arguments are distinct from
federalism and rely only on the more general principle of
decentralization.83 One reason for this is the obvious one that
federalism protects the rights of regional political entities - states, in
the American system - rather than localities. Regional governments,
however, do not display the small-scale features on which the
devolution argument depends. A more general reason is that
devolution, or decentralization, is a managerial policy that does not
depend on the kind of rights that federalism guarantees. Of course, the
policy might be more difficult to alter if it were secured by a right,
but that is a very different consideration. Many policies that are
widely regarded as desirable, such as unemployment compensation,
environmental protection, or the regulation of securities markets, are
not secured by rights because they lack the moral texture that rights
seem to possess and because the considerations that support them
might change in the future. Localism seems to belong in this category
because arguments for it are almost exclusively functional, not moral,
and because these arguments could conceivably change, perhaps as a
result of the Internet.
Whatever the virtues of localism, the concept of accountability
provides very little support for it. The main difficulty with it involves
salience. How many people pay much attention to the political events

83. See supra note 41 (citing sources for the distinction between federalism and
decentralization).
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that occur in their locality? To begin with, many Americans pay
relatively little attention to politics at any level; they may have some
strongly held beliefs, but their levels of knowledge and their levels of
participation are extremely low.84 One reason for this is that many
political issues in a modern administrative state are technical and
complex, which not only makes them seem daunting but also dull.
Another is that people have so many other sources of stimulation
these days, including movies, television, recorded music, spectator
sports, participatory sports, the Internet, and convenient travel. Most
of these activities, moreover, tend to draw one's attention away from
the locality. The entertainment industry is national; the Internet
connects people to those with similar interests anywhere in the world;
spectator sports often involve professional or Division I college teams
that draw fans from large geographic areas.
Even when people are interested in politics, it is often politics at
the state or national level. For many people, large-scale politics are
much more interesting, because of the issues involved or the sense of
significance that they convey. One simply cannot save the blue whale,
protect Israel, privatize social security, or eliminate abortion through
actions taken in one's own community. While a person can undertake
local actions to oppose abortion or protect the environment or
alleviate hunger or improve education in a single school, the positions
that people formulate on issues such as these are often conceived in
comprehensive or national terms. Social movements that generate
relatively high levels of political involvement are generally national in
scope.85 This is readily explained by either of the two dominant
explanatory theories for these movements, the American or resource
mobilization approach, and the Continental, or identity-oriented
approach.86 According to the resource-mobilization approach, social
movements are generated by leaders using a variety of instrumentally
84. See RUY A. TEIXEIRA, THE DISAPPEARING AMERICAN VOTER (1992); G. Bingham
Powell, Jr., American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective, in CONTROVERSIES IN
VOTING BEHAVIOR 56 (Richard G. Niemi & Herbert F. Weisberg eds., 3d ed. 1993). For
classic statements of this point, see WALTER LIPPMANN, THE PHANTOM PUBLIC (1925), and
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1942).
85. For general definitions of social movements, see DONATELLA DELLA PORTA &
MARIO DIANI, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: AN INTRODUCTION (1999); BARBARA EPSTEIN,
POLITICAL PROTEST AND CULTURAL REVOLUTION: NONVIOLENT DIRECT ACTION IN THE
1970s AND 1980s (1991); and JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL
SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1978).
86. For discussions of the difference between these two approaches, see Jean L. Cohen,
Strategy or Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary Social Movements, 52
Soc. RES. 663 (1985); Bert Klandermans, New Social Movements and Resource
Mobilization: The European and American Approach Revisited, in RESEARCH ON SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS: THE STATE OF THE ART IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE USA 17 (Dieter
Rucht ed., 1991); and Sidney Tarrow, Comparing Social Movement Participation in Western
Europe and the United States: Problems, Uses, and a Proposal for Synthesis, in RESEARCH
ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra at 392.
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rational strategies such as fundraising, dramatic events, and media
access.87 Clearly, these sorts of activities are best organized on the
national level and often depend on their ability to draw support from a
large number of widely dispersed people for their effectiveness.
According to the identity approach, social movements spring from
people's changing self-conceptions, from trends within civil society
that generate new opinions and beliefs.88 Again, such ideological
transformations tend to occur on a society-wide level, and most social
movements, unless they have overwhelming support, can only flourish
by uniting all the widely dispersed people who have developed a novel
self-conception.
There is, moreover, a close interconnection between the national
character of people's nonpolitical interests and the kinds of political
interests they develop. As just noted, entertainment in our society motion pictures, television, popular music, spectator sports - is often
national in scope. As a result, the common inclination to treat politics
as a form of entertainment, as a set of contests one watches on
television,89 reinforces the tendency to focus on national, rather than
local politics. The dominance of the representation principle in
electoral politics that was discussed in the preceding section, that is,
the tendency of people to vote for the sort of person they want
without detailed consideration of the issues, reflects a similarly
entertainment-oriented, nonpolitical approach to politics, because
people are more entertaining and comprehensible than issues. This
also orients the average citizen toward national politics, since it is
national figures who receive media attention and thereby become
identifiable. Most Americans know who the president is, and many

87. See, e.g. , WILLIAM A. GAMSON, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL PROTEST (2d ed. 1990);
GERALD MARWELL & PAMELA OLIVER, THE CRITICAL MASS IN COLLECTIVE ACTION: A
MICRO-SOCIAL THEORY (1993); JOHN D. MCCARTHY & MAYER N. ZALD, THE TREND OF
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AMERICA: PROFESSIONALIZATION AND RESOURCE
MOBILIZATION (1973); ANTHONY 0BERSCHALL, SOCIAL CONFLICTS AND SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS (1973); CHARLES TILLY, FROM MOBILIZATION TO REVOLUTION (1978); J.
Craig Jenkins, Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements, 9 ANN.
REV. Soc. 527 (1983).
88. See, e.g. , HANSPETER KRIESI, POLITICAL MOBILIZATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE:
THE DUTCH CASE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1993); ALBERTO MELUCCI, NOMADS
OF THE PRESENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND INDIVIDUAL NEEDS IN CONTEMPORARY
SOCIETY (John Keane & Paul Mier eds., 1989); JAN PAKULSKI, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: THE
POLITICS OF MORAL PROTEST (1991); ALAIN TOURAINE, THE VOICE AND THE EYE: AN
ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Alan Duff trans., 1981); Claus Offe, New Social
Movements: Challenging the Boundaries ofInstitutional Politics, 52 Soc. RES. 817 (1985).
89. BAUDRILLARD, SILENT MAJORITIES. supra note 17; BAUDRILLARD, SIMULATIONS,
supra note 17; RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE
(1996); EDELMAN, supra note 17, at 102; DOUGLAS KELLNER, TELEVISION AND THE CRISIS
OF DEMOCRACY (1990); NEIL POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH: PUBLIC
DISCOURSE IN THE AGE OF SHOW BUSINESS (1985).
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know their senators or representatives, but how many know even the
names of their town supervisors or local legislators?90
If people fail to attend to local politics, the devolution of political
authority to local entities cannot produce decisionmaking that is more
accoµntable to those subject to the decision. Rather, decisions taken at
the local level will be opaque to their subjects. They will be low
visibility events, because they are not reported in the media that
people watch and do not involve the issues that people regularly
follow. Instead of being controlled by ordinary citizens, these decisions
will be controlled by local elites, that is, those who are already in
control and thereby benefit from the devolution of additional
authority, or those who are unusually motivated to participate because
they have a high economic stake in the outcomes of local decisions.
Studies of local government suggest that there may be several
different elites competing with each other for control,91 but these will
be elites nonetheless and not the mass of ordinary citizens that would
support an accountability argument for devolution.92
Robert Putnam's Bowling Alone provides an historical explanation
of this present reality.93 According to Putnam, the American people's
sense of social solidarity, their level of participation in all aspects of
political and civil society, has been declining precipitously in recent
years� We have less contact with our neighbors, we join fewer
organizations, we spend less time socializing with our friends, and we
often go bowling alone. The culprits are suburbanization, an obsessive
dependence on automobiles, and the increasing influence of the mass
media, most notably television.94 Putnam paints a grim picture of

90. Similar observations about the low salience of state elections have been raised in
connection with the idea that state judges should be elected so that they will be accountable
to the electorate. See, e.g. , PHILIP L. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY (1980); Alex B. Long, "Stop Me Before
I Vote for This Judge Again": Judicial Conduct Organizations, Judicial Accountability, and
the Disciplining of Elected Judges, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (2003); Thomas R. Phillips,
Electoral Accountability and Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 137 (2003); see also
Glenn R. Winters, Selection ofJudges - An Historical Introduction, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1081,
1082-83 (1966).
91. See ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN
AMERICAN CITY (1961); FLOYD HUNTER, COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE (1953);
NELSON W. POLSBY, COMMUNITY POWER AND POLITICAL THEORY (1963).
92. See RICHARD E. FOGLESONG, MARRIED TO THE MOUSE: WALT DISNEY WORLD
AND ORLANDO (2001); PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS (1981); William W. Buzbee, Urban
Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of Institutional Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57,
63-76 (1999); William W. Buzbee, Accountability Conceptions and Federalism Tales: Disney's
Wonderful World?, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1290 (2002) (review of Foglesong, supra, emphasizing
the theme that citizens were ignored in the effort by local elites to attract Disney World to
central Florida).
93. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE (2000) .
94. Putnam's idea that television destroys political and social culture is shared by many
other commentators. See, e.g. , COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 89, at 9, 13 ("Both
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modern society, but it is difficult to imagine how it could be reversed.
The causes he identifies are not likely to be abolished or even abated
for the foreseeable future. Indeed, contemporary demographic trends
emphasize their inevitability. Putnam identifies several states that
continue to display the sort of communal life he asserts we are losing,
such as North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana and Vermont. He
identifies several other states that typify contemporary political
disconnection and social dissociation, such as Nevada, Texas, Georgia
and Florida.95 The fact that people, particularly young people, are
fleeing from Putnam's genial, well-integrated states to those he
identifies as cauldrons of anomie suggests that the trends he observes
will continue,96 as well as raises the question whether the experience of
modernity is quite as miserable as Putnam suggests.
The important point is that small-town America is largely gone.
The kinds of localities that could exercise increased authority in an
accountable manner have been ripped apart by skeins of
superhighways, telecommunications networks, and the mass media.97
Local jurisdictions that would serve as the recipients of devolved
authority are no longer self-contained towns, surrounded by ten
thousand acres of farmland or forest, but segments of suburban and
exurban sprawls demarcated by invisible and arbitrary legal lines. In
the modern world, these localities are no more salient than the
technical issues that confront elected officials. Thus, they are of little
use for increasing the accountability of government, and, in fact
devolution of government decisions to this level are more likely to
increase its opacity.
The accountability argument for devolution of authority to local
governments is conceptually connected to the principle of
participatory democracy, as opposed to the principle of federalism.
That is, devolution has nothing to do with the rights of states, qua
states, and little to do with the rights of any governmental entity but
rather draws its conceptual force from the idea that citizen
participation is essential if democracy is to prosper, or perhaps even

television's technological nature and its commercial use disfavor sustained concentration as
attention is grabbed by a dynamic, fast-moving, and ever-changing series of images" that
"helps to erode a continuous and critical social perspective."); JACQUES ELLUL, THE
TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY 379 (John Wilkinson trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1 964) (1954)
("television even more than the radio, shuts up the individual in an echoing mechanical
universe in which he is alone"); TODD GITLIN, THE WHOLE WORLD IS WATCHING: MASS
MEDIA IN THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE NEW LEFT ( 1980) .
95. PUTNAM, supra note 93, at 287-363.
96. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: POPULATION
PROFILE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1999, at 7, 15 (2001).
97. Id. at 12 ("The 219 million people living in metropolitan areas in 1999 accounted for
80 percent of all people living in the United States."). See Briffault, Our Localism, supra
note 52; Briffault, Contemporary Federalism, supra note 41.
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survive. Participatory democracy is a very fashionable idea these
days,98 but it presents rather formidable difficulties when considered
from either a descriptive or prescriptive point of view. Descriptively,
the difficulty is the one just given: people in modem American society
are generally nonparticipants, particularly in politics. As Putnam has
observed, there is an increasing trend toward an atomized social
existence, linked to the outside world through passive media such as
television. We simply cannot rely on participation at the local level to
provide accountability for government. In fact, the devolution of
authority to local governments may well produce the opposite effect.
If only a minority of Americans in any given locale choose to
participate in politics, effective participation may require that this
relatively small and generally dispersed group be aggregated at the
national level if it is to be effective. For example, the number of
people in any locality who are concerned about distant environmental
disasters like the destruction of the rain forests or the extinction of the
baleen whales is likely to be quite small, too small to influence any
public official. It is only when all these dispersed people manage to
combine into a nationwide movement that they can generate the
resources and obtain the media attention that is necessary to influence
public policy.
Participatory democracy fares no better as a normative idea.
Imposing a moral or legal obligation on people to participate in
government conflicts with our basic commitment to liberty, as Bruce
Ackerman points out.99 Citizens should be free, if they choose, to be
politically inactive, and they should be safe from being reviled as
unpatriotic or from being oppressed for failing to protect their
interests, if they make that choice. Of course, if government becomes
oppressive, if it denies all the people civil liberties or permits
mistreatment of an unpopular minority, citizens may have a moral
obligation to resist, perhaps even to engage in open disobedience at
the risk of their lives, liberty or livelihoods. But one of the greatest

98. See, e.g. , JOHN BURNHEIM, Is DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE? (1985); CAROL c. GOULD,
RETHINKING DEMOCRACY: FREEDOM AND SOCIAL COOPERATION IN POLITICS, ECONOMY
AND SOCIETY (1984); PAUL HIRST, ASSOCIATIVE DEMOCRACY: NEW FORMS OF
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE (1994); ALAIN TOURAINE, WHAT IS DEMOCRACY?
(David Macey trans., Westview Press 1997) (1994). It is related, moreover, to the equally
fashionable idea of deliberative democracy. See JOHN S. DRYZEK, DISCURSIVE
DEMOCRACY: POLITICS, POLICY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE (1990); JAMES S. FISHKIN,
DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM (1991);
AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996);
:JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996)
(1992); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION (1993) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL) ; Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and
Democratic Legitimacy, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND
POLITICS 67 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997).
99. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
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gifts that a well-ordered, morally just regime can grant its citizens is
exemption from such onerous demands. However inspiring it may be
to see people take great risks for freedom and justice, the need to risk
one's very existence in this world to secure these benefits that every
human being deserves is simply awful. The devolution of authority to
local government in the interest of accountability, by relying on
participation to control decisions that were originally made at another
level, denies people the liberty that they deserve from such demands
and effectively punishes people for their nonparticipation.
None of this is to suggest that local communities never become
mobilized about a given issue, or that local governments are never
held accountable. Such events occur, and they may count as some of
the more dramatic cases of political participation in our governmental
system. But the accountability argument for devolution of authority to
local governments cannot rest on intermittent eruptions of political
involvement, no matter how dramatic. Rather, the argument depends
on continual involvement and constant vigilance of local populations,
their ability to monitor the quotidian decisions that constitute the bulk
of virtually every assignment of government authority. Without such
vigilance, the devolution of authority to local government will, on the
whole and with few exceptions, decrease government accountability.
B.

Devolution to Private Parties: The Enforcement Process

Unlike the accountability arguments for political devolution, the
accountability arguments for devolution to private parties do not focus
on the structure of government but rather on the government's
relationship to citizens. These arguments begin with the recognition,
which other accountability arguments so often ignore, deny, or
condemn, that enforcement of public policy directives is a crucial task
of modem govemment.100 The basic idea is that enforcement will be
more effective, that it will better accomplish its ultimate purpose, if
private parties, whether organizations or individuals, are accountable
for their own actions. Such accountability can be achieved by
transferring, or devolving, power from administrative agencies and
other governmental institutions to these private parties.101 Thus,
100. That is not to say that this literature is restricted to administrative agencies. It also
discusses courts and legislatures. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual
Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001). The point is simply
that this literature, unlike other bodies of legal scholarship, takes agencies fully into account
and gives them their proper place in modem government.
101 . JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION
(2002); BRENT F!SSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME, AND
ACCOUNTABILITY (1993); MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION
AND THE PUBLIC GOOD (2002); L. David Brown & Mark H. Moore, A ccountability, Strategy
and International Nongovernmental Organizations, 30 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR
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accountability arguments for enforcement devolution recommend that
classic command-and-control regulations be replaced with a more
cooperative and collaborative approach. The resulting mode of
governance is sometimes described as New Public Governance, or the
post-regulatory state.
Arguments for devolving enforcement to private parties draw on
some of the most convincing and illuminating insights in modern social
science. Human behavior and human institutions, we have learned, are
enormously complex. They are grounded on an intersubjective process
that creates the interpretive framework, or structure of meaning, that
makes individual thought possible, and that generates social
institutions. These institutions then become part of the intersubjective
process by which new interpretive frameworks and structures of
meaning are created.102 Thus, social scientists are beginning to connect
the growth and operation of institutions with the internal experience
of individuals, demonstrating that individual motivation and
construction of meaning generate institutions and that institutions
affect individual motivation and meaning. Much of this process occurs
in civil society, that is, in the set of interactive relationships among
people that is separate from either the economic or political systems.103
Rejecting the Hobbesian view that society is essentially political and
the Marxian view that society is essentially economic, modern social
scientists have revealed the truly social character of the process that
underlies all human behavior and human institutions.
One of the most important lessons that has been derived from
these insights is that neither individual nor institutional behavior can
be readily altered by simple government ukase. The intersubjective
processes of civil society are generally too robust to be effectively
controlled in this manner, particularly in an open, nonrepressive

Q. 569 (2001); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); Jerry L. Mashaw, Contracting Out and the
Structure of Accountability (Sept. 9, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author);
Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. Iacobucci, Privatization and Accountability, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 1422 (2003).
102. See generally PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1966);
RICHARD S. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND 0BJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM (1983); NELSON
GOODMAN, WAYS OF WORLDMAKING (1978); RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE
MIRROR OF NATURE (1979); ALFRED SCHUTZ, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL
WORLD (George Walsh & Frederick Lehnert trans., 1967); PETER WINCH, THE IDEA OF A
SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS RELATION TO PHILOSOPHY (1958).
103. See generally JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL
THEORY (1992); HABERMAS, supra note 98, at 359-87; JOHN KEANE, DEMOCRACY AND
CIVIL SOCIETY (1988); NIKLAS LUHMANN, THE DIFFERENTIATION OF SOCIETY (Stephen
Holmes & Charles Larmore trans., 1982); ADAM B. SELIGMAN, THE IDEA OF CIVIL
SOCIETY (1992).
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system like our own.104 Sometimes government commands will
provoke resistance because they conflict with personal attitudes,
institutional structures and patterns of meaning in civil society. More
often, they will be ignored or reinterpreted in a manner that
undermines their intended purpose. To be sure, the government can
impose sanctions on those who violate its commands, but sanctions are
too costly, both politically and economically, to be relied on in the face
of widespread noncompliance.
On the basis of these insights, social scientists and legal scholars
have begun to develop new approaches to the implementation of
social policy and administrative programs.105 This literature is too
subtle and complex to be briefly summarized, but it will be enough for
present purposes to note some of its major themes. First, it argues that
effective implementation cannot be based on commands issued by a
government agency that emerge from the agency's own needs and
modes of thought, without paying any attention to the subjects of the
program. Rather, the agency must take cognizance of the
organizational structure of the firm, or the meaning structure of the
individual. Second, the best way to take cognizance of these complex
matters is to open a dialogue with the firm or individual, to learn
about them through what Weber called verstehn, or empathetic
understanding.106 Third, in order to implement the program, to obtain
compliance with its essential features, the firm or individual should be
allowed to play an active role in the implementation process. This is

104. The vigor of the black market in the Soviet Union suggests that even enormously
repressive regimes have difficulty controlling people by direct command. See JANOS
KORNAI, THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM (1992).
105. E.g. , IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); BRONWEN MORGAN, SOCIAL
CITIZENSHIP IN THE SHADOW OF COMPETITION: THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS OF
REGULATORY JUSTIFICATION (2003); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT: LAW, BUSINESS, AND THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY (2001);
Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875
(2003); Daniel A. Farber, Revitalizing Regulation, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1278 (1993); Jody
Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997);
Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Regulatory Pluralism: Designing Policy Mixes for
Environmental Protection, 21 LAW & POL'Y 49 (1999); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The
Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 Minn. L.
Rev. 324 (2004); Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal Modes of
Administrative Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 159 (2000 ) ; Sturm, supra note 100; Gunther
Teubner, After Legal Instrumentalism? Strategic Models of Post-regulatory Law, in
D ILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE (Gunther Teubner ed., 1986).
106. 1 WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 8-9; MAX WEBER,
"Objectivity" in Social Science and Social Policy, in THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 49, 50-85 (Edward A. Shils & Henry A. Finch eds. & trans., Free Press 1949)
(1917)(hereinafter WEBER, Objectivity]; MAX WEBER, The Meaning of "Ethical Neutrality"
in Sociology and Economics, supra, at 1, 40-43. See FRITZ RINGER, MAX WEBER'S
METHODOLOGY: THE UNIFICATION OF THE CULTURAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 92-121
(1997).
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partially achieved by the dialogue established by the agency but more
effectively pursued by allowing the firm or individual to develop its
own strategies for compliance. Fourth, these strategies will be most
effective if the firm or individual internalizes them, that is, absorbs
them into its meaning structure so that they become part of its mode
of operation or existence. Fifth, this process can be tied into the
layered or interactive character of civil society. Instead of interacting
directly with the subject, in the manner just described, the agency can
interact with an intermediate institution, and that institution, once it
has developed and internalized a compliance strategy, can then
interact with the subject. In doing so, it can use the same process,
often in a more subtle and effective manner than the agency. In
summary, new approaches to implementation often devolve the
authority to devise implementation techniques to the subject or to an
intermediate institution.
There is widespread enthusiasm for implementation programs of
this sort at present. Several have already been enacted into law, while
others now serve as a modus operandi for administrative agencies. The
U.S. Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, adopted in 1991 ,107
recommend greatly reduced penalties for corporate violations if the
corporation has developed and implemented its own program for
enforcing ethical business conduct. The Guidelines list minimum
requirements for an effective program, including promulgating a
written code, communicating the code to employees, establishing
monitoring systems to detect violations, encouraging employees to
report such violations, responding to any violations that are detected,
and taking all reasonable steps to prevent future violations. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,1 08 passed in response to the Enron
scandal, relies heavily on the Guidelines, requiring that all companies
subject to the Act file reports describing their internal ethics codes and
increasing the penalties for firms that fail to meet the criteria specified
in the Guidelines.
The term accountability is sometimes used to describe the subject's
reaction in this New Public Governance mode of implementation. 1 09
The subject, it is said, becomes accountable for its actions by
participating in the implementation process. Rather than being told
what to do, the firm or individual develops its own approach, through
an open dialogue with the agency, and then takes responsibility for
107. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
8A.1.2 (2001). See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakrnan, Controlling Corporate Misconduct:
An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997); Kimberly D.
Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q.
487 (2003).
108. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7201-7266 (West Supp. 2004).
109. See supra note 105 (citing sources).
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implementing or internalizing the approach that it developed. Thus,
there has been a devolution of authority from the implementing
agency to the subject. Rather than being given a command to end
discrimination or control unethical business practices, the firm is
invited to develop its own strategy and is described as becoming
accountable for either the strategy itself or the results that it achieves.
Similarly, rather than simply being subject to a prescribed punishment,
a miscreant individual may be invited to propose a plan for altering his
behavior and then be described as having become accountable for
either the plan or the behavior.110
To describe implementation programs of this sort in terms of
accountability is usually inaccurate and potentially dangerous as well.
The firms and individuals who are subject to these programs are not
being made accountable for their own actions or making their own
choices; they are being manipulated by the administrative state. These
modern implementation strategies may be more effective, but if so,
they are effective because they get inside the firm's internal structure,
or the individual's head, and alter their behavior to achieve a
collectively established social purpose. Far from granting the subject
autonomy or making it accountable for its own actions, they
undermine its will to resist, making it an accomplice in the
governmental effort to control it. 111 The devolution of authority is set
within a larger framework of continued supervision. Of course, there
may be no supervision, but in that case, there is no accountability in
any real sense.112 This is also dangerous, as it misleads us into thinking
that the firm is being supervised or controlled, while in actuality it can
violate applicable public norms with impunity.
If the subject firm or individual is truly accountable to the
implementing agency in the standard bureaucratic sense that it must
answer for disobedience, then it will be punished if it does not behave
110. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION
(2002); JOHN BRAITHWAITE, REGULATION, CRIME, FREEDOM (2000); FISSE &
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 101; LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, EVIDENCE-BASED POLICING
(1998), at http://www.policefoundation.org/pdf/Sherman.pdf.
1 11. See NORMAN B. MACINTOSH, MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL
SYSTEMS: AN ORGANIZATIONAL AND BEHAVIORAL APPROACH 246-49 (1994) (discussing
pseudo-empowerment).
1 12. Michael Trebilcock and Edward Iacobucci argue that the market provides
accountability for private firms because of the discipline imposed by market competition, so
that accountability can be achieved without any supervision. Supra note 101, at 1447-51. But,
while there are certainly issues of bureaucratic accountability within the hierarchical
structure of every firm of significant size, see RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A
BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (1963); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND
HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975), market competition does
not make the firm answerable to anyone; it is simply a constraint on its actions which
sometimes works to the benefit of consumers and sometimes works to their detriment. Their
claim is equivalent to saying that Newton's laws of motion make drivers accountable to
pedestrians.
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the way the agency wants. It is true that what the agency wants has
become less specific and more rational in the New Public Governance
Model. Instead of identifying a goal, choosing the implementation
strategy it thinks will work, and then requiring the subject to obey that
implementation strategy, whether it works or not, the agency now
identifies a goal, lets the subject choose part or all of the
implementation strategy, and evaluates the success of its efforts by
determining whether or not it has achieved its goal. But this does not
alter the basic reality that the agency is imposing a particular goal on
the firm or individual. It simply means that instead of making
unnecessary and possibly counterproductive demands for compliance,
it can now avoid making these demands because it has the
sophistication to get inside the subject and enlist it in achieving the
agency's objectives.
Consider the example of combating drug abuse through treatment
and rehabilitation programs that ask the individual to propose his own
strategy for getting and staying off drugs.113 Such programs are
undoubtedly more humane than incarceration without treatment, and
they are almost certainly more effective. They exist, however, in a
context where the government is compelling the individual - albeit in
a more humane and effective way - to do what the government
wants, not what the individual wants. It is possible that the individual
really does want to stop using drugs and welcomes criminal culpability
as a means of compensating for a weakness of the will. More often,
however, what the individual wants is to be in the same situation
regarding his chemical stimulant of choice as alcohol users are
regarding theirs, namely to be able to indulge his habit cheaply, safely,
and in peace. Society, in its collective wisdom, has decided that he may
not do so, however. Given this prohibition of his real desires, the
addict probably prefers the rehabilitation program to incarceration,
but that does not mean that he has been made accountable or
responsible for his actions. Rather, he has been compelled and given a
choice about the method of compulsion.
To be sure, the subject of the implementation program may
ultimately accept the government's goal as its own. That is certainly
the intention, and it is certainly the most effective implementation
strategy, since compliance will then be voluntary and require far fewer
government resources to achieve the same results. But one must be
careful about the way one characterizes this process, since it poses real
dangers. Our theory of government is based, at least in part, on the
idea that people's views are exogenous to their interaction with the
government, that the government is supposed to respond to their

1 13. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent
Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831 (2000).
·
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desires, not create them. Our electoral process provides some
guarantee that the new implementation techniques will be used to
support collective purposes and against only those firms and
individuals who violate those purposes. Nonetheless, a large enough
number of actions taken at the individualized level can have systemic
consequences, so that governmental action directed against those
actions can serve as a means of altering widely held beliefs. One does
not need to endorse Genet's view of the criminal as an existential
hero114 to perceive a real danger in the government's ability to alter
collective norms through individualized sanctions.
The danger can be highlighted by considering Pavlovian thought
reform, an early but still important effort to achieve voluntary
compliance from a recalcitrant subject. Although Pavlov is associated,
in the popular mind, with having trained dogs to salivate at the sound
of a bell, he did not discover this technique but was simply using it to
produce saliva for his experiments on digestion. What he did discover
was that, when he rescued his dogs from near death in a flood, their
conditioned reflex was gone. Further experimentation revealed that
the application of stress, if continued long enough, could extirpate a
good deal of learned behavior and leave the subject ready to be taught
new behaviors by the experimenter.115 Use of this technique on human
beings in the Soviet Union and China revealed that the stress had to
be applied beyond the point when the subject ceased resisting and said
what he thought he was supposed to say, and up to the point when the
subject ceased thinking for himself, and asked his interlocutor what he
was supposed to think. 116
It is not hard to imagine a variant of this technique being used with
a recalcitrant firm. Implementation theorists have suggested that the
most effective strategy that an agency can use to obtain compliance
from a large group of regulated entities is the "nice" strategy of Tit for
Tat, which applies punishment only in response to disobedience and
ceases as soon as the disobedient behavior stops.m In a case of
1 14. JEAN GENET, OUR LADY OF THE FLOWERS (Bernard Frechtman trans., Grove
Press, 1963) (1952). See JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, SAINT GENET: ACTOR AND MARTYR 60-154
(Bernard Frechtman trans., George Braziller 1963) (1952).
115. 2 IVAN PETROVITCH PAVLOV, LECTURES ON CONDITIONED REFLEXES:
CONDITIONED REFLEXES AND PSYCHIATRY (W. Horsley Gantt ed. & trans., 1941}; IVAN
PETROVITCH PAVLOV, ESSENTIAL WORKS OF PAVLOV (Michael Kaplan ed., 1966); YURI P.
FROLOV, PAVLOV AND HIS SCHOOL: THE THEORY OF CONDITIONED REFLEXES (C.P. Dutt
trans., 1937); WILLIAM SARGANT, BATTLE FOR THE MIND 51-75 (1957).
1 16. ROBERT JAY LIFTON, THOUGHT REFORM AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TOTALISM:
A STUDY OF "BRAINWASHING" IN CHINA (1989); SARGANT, supra note 115, at 77-101;
EDGAR H. SCHEIN ET AL., COERCIVE PERSUASION (1961). The classic fictional portrayal is
ARTHUR KOESTLER, DARKNESS AT NOON (Daphne Hardy trans., 1941).
1 17. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 20-27 (1992}; Robert A. Kagan & John T.
Scholz, The "Criminology of the Corporation " and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies, in
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genuine recalcitrance, however, the agency might begin imposing
sanctions and then continue imposing them until there is a breakdown
in the structure of the firm and a new structure could be put in place.
This is essentially what happened in the prison reform cases that the
federal courts decided during the 1970s and 1980s, where the federal
courts imposed a set of constitutional standards on state prisons.
Confronted with recalcitrant state prisons, the judges moved from
case-by-case adjudication to continuous monitoring. Retaining
jurisdiction of the initial claim, sometimes for as long as a decade, they
imposed a continuing stream of orders and sanctions until the old
system simply broke down, the warden retired, and new officials who
would voluntarily comply with the constitutional standards were
installed in his stead. By that point, the prison had, through a process
of internal reform triggered by the stress of judicial supervision,
become a different institution.118
There is probably nothing objectionable about what the federal
courts did in the prison cases. Prisons are public institutions that do
not themselves have rights, and the prisons that were the subject of
this intensive supervision were imposing truly barbarous treatment on
individuals who, despite their incarcerated status, did have rights. The
mere fact that the approach used by the courts can be analogized to
Pavlovian thought reform does not render it invalid. But it cannot
truly be said that the prisons became accountable for their actions or
took responsibility for them. Rather, these institutions were
transformed by a severe and effective method, a method that reflects
sophisticated current thinking about governmental implementation
strategies.
It is theoretically possible that administrative agencies or other
public institutions would encourage genuine accountability on the part
of private actors. To do so, they would need to abandon their fixed
commitments to particular goals, as well as to particular techniques,
and open themselves to a genuine dialogue about the purposes that
regulation was designed to achieve. This would make the private actor
an equal partner in the regulatory enterprise, rather than a subject to
ENFORCING REGULATION 67 (Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas eds., 1984); John T.
Scholz, Cooperation, Deterrence, and the Ecology of Regulatory Enforcement, 18 LAW &
SOC'Y REV. 179 (1984); John T. Scholz, Voluntary Compliance and Regulatory Enforcement,
6 LAW & POL'Y 385 (1984). See generally ROBERT AxELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF
COOPERATION (1984) (general analysis of Tit for Tat as an optimal strategy in repeated
games).
118. For general discussions of the prison reform process, see BRADLEY STEWART
CHILTON, PRISONS UNDER THE GAVEL: THE FEDERAL COURT TAKEOVER OF GEORGIA
PRISONS (1991); BEN M. CROUCH & JAMES W. MARQUART, AN APPEAL TO JUSTICE:
LITIGATED REFORM OF TEXAS PRISONS (1989); FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 41; STEVE J.
MARTIN & SHELDON EKLAND-0LSON, TEXAS PRISONS: THE WALLS CAME TuMBLING
DOWN (1987); and LARRY w. YACKLE, REFORM AND REGRET: THE STORY OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE ALABAMA PRISON SYSTEM (1989).
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be manipulated, however subtly. But government agencies are
unlikely to adopt this approach, and it would not be normatively
desirable for them to do so. Agencies are part of a hierarchically
organized government apparatus that transmits goals and expectations
from one level to another, a system of superiors and subordinates
where subordinates are held accountable in the true, bureaucratic
sense of this term. It is not likely that a subordinate official could tell
his superior, or his superior tell the president or a congressional
committee, that he had changed the purpose of the regulatory
program after consultation with the subjects of the regulation.
Moreover, these purposes represent the collective decisions of a
democratic government. They are not typically selected by the voters,
for reasons described above, but they are selected by elected officials
who represent the voters. To allow those purposes to be so readily
undermined would raise much more serious normative problems than
are raised by the flexible strategies that modern implementation
theory recommends.119 In summary, the devolution of enforcement to
private parties has certain virtues as a governance technique, but
describing it as making those parties accountable either conceals
government manipulation of behavior behind a fa�ade of apparent
cooperation, or threatens to undermine the collective goals that the
government is morally entitled to pursue.
C.

What Lies Beneath

Accountability arguments for devolution of authority to local
government or private parties are distinctly different from each other,
but they spring from the same source, and that source is the same as
the source that unites electoral accountability arguments for
nondelegation, the unitary executive and federalism. It is an abiding
hostility toward the administrative state, a desire to deny or dissipate
its all-too-evident reality. The idea of accountability serves as an
alternative to administration in these arguments; if local governments
or private persons are accountable for their actions, then they do not
require the sort of regulation, or ongoing supervision, that has fueled
the expansion of modern bureaucracy. As before, this is not to say that
devolving authority to local government or private parties are
necessarily bad ideas, but rather that these ideas must rest on other
grounds, and cannot be bolstered by arguments based on
accountability. Use of the accountability concept in these contexts is
alluring, but because it is essentially political escapism, it will
ultimately mislead us, encouraging the adoption of policies that will

1 19. Even flexible strategies may raise serious concerns that need to be addressed. For
an attempt to do so, see FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 41, at 362-88.
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produce effects quite different from those we seek when we invoke
accountability.
The idea that devolving authority to local government will increase
accountability does not appear to be anti-administrative on its face.
After all, the authority might be transferred to localities from elected
officials at the state or federal level, that is, from precisely those
officials who were described above as the beneficiaries of our anti
administrative instincts. For example, one could recommend, in
theory, that the increased responsibility for making public policy having been transferred to Congress, or the president, or state officials
on accountability grounds by the nondelegation doctrine, the unitary
executive idea, or federalism - should now be transferred to local
officials on the same grounds. But accountability arguments for
transfer of authority to elected officials generally envision that the
authority will rest with these officials. The arguments favor elected
officials because they are selected by a process of collective choice, not
because they can serve as a convenient way station for some further
transfer of authority. As discussed above, these arguments are
fanciful, but the one bit of realism they contain is that they recognize
the national character of modern politics. To abandon that recognition
is to descend into an even deeper political fantasy. It is truly difficult
to imagine that local governments could make basic decisions
regarding foreign policy, monetary policy, or even agriculture policy,
particularly by some means that could be described as accountable to
their citizens, and that these local decisions could be somehow
aggregated into national action.
In fact, hardly anyone argues for the devolution of high-level
policy making, of the sort that elected officials are supposed to
formulate, to local entities. Accountability arguments regarding high
level policy typically seek to transfer authority to elected officials at
the national level, specifically Congress and the president, in the
manner that was discussed above; at their furthest reach, these
arguments recommend transfer of authority to elected state officials.
Recommendations to devolve government authority to local
government almost always refer to administrative authority, the
authority to implement public policy or to establish policy relating to
more local matters, such as policing, health care, welfare, housing, or
education. Because these functions are typically carried out by
administrative agencies at the state or federal level, their devolution to
localities represents the transfer of authority from administrative
agencies, and accountability arguments in their favor convey a
distinctly anti-administrative tone.
Just as it is possible to imagine that the devolution to localities is
not anti-administrative because it represents a transfer of authority
from elected officials, it is possible to imagine that it is not anti
administrative because the local organizations to which authority is
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transferred would be essentially administrative in character. This has
a certain realism to it, particularly when the locality is a place like New
York City or Los Angeles. But in fact, the devolution of authority
to localities and certainly the accountability arguments in favor of
such devolution typically do not envision bureaucratic agencies as
the recipients of the transferred authority. Indeed, they do not
typically imagine New York or L.A. as the localities. What is typically
envisioned is the transfer of authority to a relatively simple structure
in a relatively small locality. This is the only situation where the newly
exercised authority could be reasonably regarded as transparent to the
citizens, and thus represent an increase in accountability.
The reasons why increased accountability is unlikely to result from
this scenario have been discussed above. The further point that is
being argued here is that the entire concept is inherently anti
administrative and is suspect on that basis. It is sustained by the desire
to escape the administrative structure of modern government and to
implement public policy through simple, small-scale structures that
communicate directly with the governed. There is thus a strong link
between the idea of devolving authority to localities and the
essentially antiadministrative idea of communitarianism.120 Both these
notions envision small, self-contained political entities, where people's
attention is focused on local events and people's energies are directed
to participation in those events. It is an idyll of small-town America, a
pastoral vision that beckons to us from our nostalgia for a bygone,
non-administrative past.
Clearly, there is a close, albeit complex, relationship between
bureaucratization and scale.121 Large institutions, at least in the
modern world, are almost always organized bureaucratically, while
small ones can be organized on different principles, some of which
may render them more accountable to those they serve. The
devolution of authority to local authorities can thus be viewed as an
alternative to bureaucratization. It is also an invitation to nostalgia.
During the early Middle Ages, Europe was divided into rather large
political entities - the Holy Roman Empire, France, the Angevin

120. See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES
AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA (1993); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S
DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996); PHILIP SELZNICK,
THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH: SOCIAL THEORY AND THE PROMISE OF COMMUNITY
(1992). For a critique, see Kathryn Abrams, Kitsch and Community, 84 MICH. L. REV. 941
(1986), and Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 685 (1992).
121. See JACOBY, supra note 58; WOLFGANG J. MOMMSEN, THE AGE OF
BUREAUCRACY: PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF MAX WEBER (1974);
WEBER, supra note 4, at 971-87.
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Empire, and England.122 But the administrative apparatus needed to
govern entities of this size was beyond the reach of Europeans at the
time. Instead, control was decentralized through the device of
feudalism, which granted virtual autonomy to subsidiary units in
exchange for loyalty to the regime.123 This complementary relationship
between bureaucracy and devolution continues to the present day.
Bureaucratization follows almost inevitably from large-scale
institutions, and the devolution of authority to smaller units represents
the only realistic possibility of avoiding it.124 Such devolution, for
reasons already discussed, will not lead to any real increases in
accountability. The claim that it will, however, gains increased appeal
from the implicit understanding that devolution is an alternative to the
administrative state.
The inclination to describe flexible implementation techniques
in terms of accountability also reflects an abiding discomfort or
hostility to the realities of the administrative state. 1 25 If flexible
implementation truly made the private parties involved accountable
for their actions, then the process could not properly be described as
regulation. Rather, it would be a truly collaborative enterprise, where
individualized interactions replaced hierarchy and a spirit of benign
camaraderie replaced the instrumental rationality of the Weberian
state. This seems appealing at first, and all sorts of positive terms such
as cooperation, mutual respect, egalitarianism, and open mindedness
come to mind as descriptions of it. The difficulty is that this approach

122. Europe was also divided into a welter of smaller political entities. What defined the
large ones, however, was that they all recognized the authority of a single king or Emperor.
See JANET L. NELSON, POLITICS AND RITUAL IN EARLY MEDIEVAL EUROPE (1986).
123. GEOFFREY BARRACLOUGH, THE ORIGINS OF MODERN GERMANY (1984);
HEINRICH FICHTENAU, THE CAROLINGIAN EMPIRE (Peter Munz trans., 1978); F.L.
GANSHOF, THE CAROLINGIANS AND THE FRANKISH MONARCHY: STUDIES IN
CAROLINGIAN HISTORY (Janet Sondheimer trans., 1971); FRAN<;:OIS LOUIS GANSHOF,
FRANKISH INSTITUTIONS UNDER CHARLEMAGNE (Bryce Lyon & Mary Lyon trans., 1968).
124. The problem, of course, is that such avoidance comes at an unacceptably high cost.
In medieval Europe's case, it cost a thousand years of internal disorder and bloodshed; in
our case, it leads to the abandonment of our collective goals, the dismantling of the welfare
state, and a probable descent into that same condition of disorder.
125. See, for example, Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 101, at 1448-49, which argues
against public supervision of firms by declaring that government bureaucracy involves "rigid
job classification systems, lockstep and seniority-based systems of promotion, a lack of
pecuniary or nonpecuniary reward systems for superior individual performance or for
innovative or productivity-enhancing ideas, high levels of job security, rigid line-item budget
constraints, budgeting cycles that entail forfeiture of unspent monies and reduced future
budget allocations that create incentives to 'move the money' at the end of the cycle - in
general, a web of bureaucratic red tape driven by concerns over process and inputs and not
outcomes." This tirade is not only overstated - and recognized since 1932 as applicable to
private firms as well, see ADOLPH BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1991) - but largely beside the point. The
accountability issue is not whether private firms are taken over and run as government
institutions, but whether they are regulated.
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to governance represents a major retrenchment of our ability to
achieve collective goals. The majority would no longer be able to
deploy the machinery of government to impose its desires on the
economic or social system. Instead, each private person or institution
would have the opportunity to establish its own goals with help,
guidance, and advice from the unbureaucratic agents of the
collectivity.126
To find a government such as this in American history, we must
return again to the 1820s, and perhaps earlier. At this preregulatory
time, government rarely interfered with private enterprise.127 If one
wanted to start a bank, for example, one simply collected some capital
and started one. If one had enough capital, one would locate the new
bank in a city. If one did not and feared that depositors and payees
would make use of their common-law right to come in and demand
their money over the counter, then one would start a wildcat bank,
that is, a bank located somewhere in the woods, where the wildcats
lived.128 Individuals were subject to coercive laws, of course, but, as
Hegel noted, if one did not like these laws, one could move to the
frontier and live beyond the effective reach of legal rules.129 The
picture is not exact, to be sure, but it seems as close to a nonregulatory
state as we have gotten, or are likely to get.
What the bitter experience of the nineteenth century taught us is
that a modem economic system of industrial production, when
granted such latitude, will lead to grinding oppression, inequality, and
social dislocation at a level that the majority of people - those who
do not own the means of production - will find unacceptable. Denied
the franchise, they will rebel; granted the franchise, they will vote for
public officials who will create an administrative state and impose
126. Cf DRUCKER, supra note 11, at 281-98 (explaining the need for centrally
established goals in private firm setting).
127. The origins of bureaucratic government in the United States are usually placed
during the Jacksonian era. See MATIHEW c. CRENSON, THE FEDERAL MACHINE:
BEGINNINGS OF BUREAUCRACY IN JACKSONIAN AMERICA (1975); WILLIAM E. NELSON,
THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN B UREAUCRACY 1830-1900 (1982); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE
DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM (1971); LEONARD D. WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS: A STUDY IN
ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 1829-61 (1954). The development of a federal bureaucracy is
generally dated somewhat later. See RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, YANKEE LE VIATHAN:
THE ORIGINS OF CENTRAL STATE AUTHORITY IN AMERICA, 1859-77 (1990); B RIAN J.
COOK, B UREAUCRACY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT 79-86 (1996); MCCRAW, supra note 27.
This even applies to the military bureaucracy. See WILLIAM H. RIKER, SOLDIERS OF THE
STATES: THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1957).
128. See B RAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA: FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR (1957).
129. GEORG WILHEIM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 86 (J. Sibree
trans., 1956). Because of this lack of population pressure, and, in his view, the consequent
lack of regulatory governance, Hegel dismisses the United States as a useful example in his
theory of state development. Id. at 87; see also FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE
FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1920).
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their goals on the owners.130 One hundred years later, this state, with
its health and safety legislation, unemployment compensation, labor
regulation, environmental protection, social security, public housing,
and innumerable other regulatory programs, is so well established that
it is easy to overlook its general significance, and concentrate on
its specific and apparent failures. None of its regulatory programs
work perfectly, and some do not even work particularly well.
But abandoning the entire apparatus is not only infeasible, but
inconceivable; it is not on the current political agenda of any
industrialized nation.
The creative regulatory techniques described as New Public
Governance are a promising way to improve the performance of our
regulatory apparatus. Many regulatory programs still bear the imprint
of their gestation; they still embed the adversarial, contentious quality
that regulation first displayed when it was being advanced in
opposition to the prevailing traditional or laissez-faire approach to
governance.131 They treat the regulated party as an opponent,
employing commands backed by sanctions in an unsophisticated
attempt to compel specified behaviors. These features can now be
modified and, in many cases, should be. There are more effective ways
to obtain compliance and more cooperative means for defining the
behaviors that will lead to the desired results. But this promising
reformulation of our regulatory system crosses the line into the
abandonment of collective goals at prec;:isely the point where we begin
to think of regulated parties as responsible for their own actions. At
that point, regulation is no longer achieving the long-term goals that
the majority of citizens desire. Rather, it is being undermined by the
conflicting goals of the regulated parties.
In the final analysis, the modern regulatory state is not only
bureaucratic, impersonal, and unpoetic, but also uncomfortably
partisan. It imposes the desires of the majority on the elites who
can advance perfectly plausible claims to their own social vision.
It reflects the fact that a political struggle took place in which salaried
people triumphed and owners of capital were defeated. Although
our democratic political ideology endorses this result, it has
some disconcerting features, features to which the Supreme Court

130. See REINHARD BENDIX, NATION-BUILDING AND CITIZENSHIP (1977); JURGEN
HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1975) (1973);
GILES MACDONOGH, PRUSSIA: THE PERVERSION OF AN IDEA (1994); ADAM PRZEWORSKI,
CAPITALISM AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY (1985); Seymour Martin Lipset, Radicalism or
Reformism: The Sources of Working-class Politics, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1 (1983).
131. See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF
LAW (2001); PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION:
TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW (1978); Richard B. Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 Mo. L. REV.
86 (1986); Teubner, supra note 105.
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reacted in the substantive due process cases,132 and that still trouble
many observers, to say nothing of those who are subject to its
consequences.133 But that is the political world that we inhabit. Adding
the idea of accountability to current regulatory reform efforts goes
beyond the effort to improve our regulatory system and expresses an
underlying hostility toward that system that few people would be
willing to defend in explicit terms. Like accountability arguments for
devolution of authority to local government, accountability arguments
for devolving authority to private parties express a counterproductive
nostalgia for a world that we have lost, and that we would be both
unable and unwilling to retain.
III. THE REAL ROLE OF ACCOUNTABILITY
If, as argued above, the concept of accountability cannot be used
to describe elected officials' relationship to voters or the devolution of
authority to local institutions or to private persons, does this familiar
concept have any meaning at all? In fact, it has a well-established
meaning and serves as a useful concept for describing certain
relationships in modern government. As used in ordinary language,
accountability refers to the ability of one actor to demand an
explanation or justification of another actor for its actions and to
reward or punish that second actor on the basis of its performance or
its explanation. The concept is useful because it is a basic mechanism
of administrative or bureaucratic government, that is, of the mode
of government that is dominant at the present time and shows no
sign of being displaced. It is precisely this connection to administra
tive government that makes the term accountability such an appeal
ing device for expressing anti-administrative impulses such as
nondelegation, localism, and the devolution of public authority. And it
is precisely this connection that makes these efforts to use the term for
anti-administrative purposes so incoherent.

132. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932); Coppage v. Kansas,
236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905). See generally HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE
AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA (1993); SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL, supra note 98, at 40-67 (1993);
Robert C. Post, Defending the Lifeworld: Substantive Due Process in the Taft Court Era, 78
B.U. L. REV. 1489 (1998).
133. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS (1995); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1980).
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The Basic Concept

The real role of accountability in a modern state must be sought
within the complex structure of the administrative hierarchies that
constitute our basic mechanism for governing ourselves.
Accountability is one means by which superiors control subordinates,
and thus a means by which policies promulgated at the highest levels
of government - the president, the legislature, or the heads of
agencies - are translated into governmental action.134 It is not the
only means of superv1s1on, however. An understanding of
accountability thus requires us to determine when it is being used,
when it is not being used, and why this choice has been made. Such
organizational issues are crucial to the performance of the
governmental agencies that we rely on so heavily in the modern
administrative state.135
Consider a simple governmental task - maintaining the lawns in
front of the public buildings in a city. This task involves, at a
minimum, cutting the grass, removing weeds, cleaning up trash, and
replacing grass that has been destroyed by foot traffic. It might also
include planting and maintaining ornamental flowers or adding
aesthetic elements like outdoor sculptures. Initial responsibility for
this task, as for virtually any other governmental task, has been
assigned to an agency, which I will call the Bureau of Public Buildings.
The chief administrator of this bureau, called the superintendent, has
a subordinate who is specifically charged with maintaining the lawns,
and the subordinate has a group of manual laborers under his control
who perform the actual maintenance functions. This is the Grounds
Department, and he is the department chief. We will assume that the
superintendent, the chief, and all the relevant employees are civil
servants; the superintendent may have appointed the chief, or the
chief may have already been in his position when the superintendent
arrived. The chief might have some professional subordinates between
him and the manual laborers or he might not, depending on the size of
the city.

134. See David Saperstein, Public Accountability and Faith-Based Organizations: A
Problem Best Avoided, 1 16 HARV. L. REV. 1353 (2003). In response to MINOW, supra note
101 , who argues that privatization can be disciplined through democratic accountability, see
id. at 1259-71, Saperstein points out that the real mechanism of accountability is
administrative, and, as a result, Bush's faith-based initiative program will inevitably lead to
regulatory supervision of religious institutions. Minow does acknowledge administrative
supervision as one form of accountability, see id. at 1268-69, but her primary emphasis is on
democratic processes such as election and public debate.
135. See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND
WHY THEY Do IT 3-24 (1989). See id. at 14 ("The German army, the Texas prisons, and
Carver High School did a better job than their rivals because they were, or became, better
organizations.").
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Ordinary language, as well as a more reflective analysis, indicates
that the superintendent is the person who is in a position to hold the
chief accountable for his actions. Other people might be in this
position as well - the superintendent's superior, the chief executive of
the city, the city council, or a special assistant appointed by any of
these entities - but the most obvious person to hold the chief
accountable is the superintendent, his immediate hierarchical
supervisor. In order to hold the chief accountable, the superintendent
must then tell the chief what she wants him to do, that is, she must
issue some sort of instructions to him. Accountability, then, involves
two elements: first, a hierarchical relationship, and second, a standard
that the hierarchical superior imposes on a subordinate.
With respect to the first element of accountability, a recent
discussion of the subject by Mark Seidenfeld is particularly helpful.136
Relying on psychological studies, Seidenfeld suggests that
accountability can improve decisionmaking by reducing some of the
heuristic biases on which decisionmakers frequently rely.137 For
accountability to produce this effect, psychological studies suggest, the
decisionmaker must be aware that he will be held accountable before
he decides, and he must accept the legitimacy of the person imposing
the standard. It is the purpose of an administrative hierarchy to
resolve these issues in a definitive manner; the hierarchy defines
supervisory relationships and declares those relationships to be
authoritativeY8 These features are not unique to an administrative
hierarchy, of course. They also apply to the legislature's or the
judiciary's relationship to the administrative apparatus in its
entirety.139 Because the command structure in these cases involves the
relationship between large institutions and often occurs only after a
considerable period of time has elapsed, a particular administrator's
awareness that she will be held accountable is likely to be attenuated.

136. Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486 (2002).
137. Id. at 508-26.
138. My inclination is to avoid the term legitimacy in this context. See EDWARD RUBIN,
BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE MODERN STATE
(forthcoming 2005). The term is inconsistent with the prevailing definition in political
science, which refers to the acceptability of a political regime in its entirety. See, e.g.,
RODNEY BARKER, POLIDCAL LEGIDMACY AND THE STATE 11-24 (1990); JURGEN
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 71-74 (William Rehg trans., The MIT Press
1996) (1992); JORGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 36-37 (Thomas McCarthy trans.,
Beacon Press, 1975) (1973); RONALD ROGOWSKI, RATIONAL LEGITIMACY: A THEORY OF
POLITICAL SUPPORT (1974); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 25 (1990);
WEBER, supra note 4, at 31; Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimization in the Sociology of
Law, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 379. Even worse, it harkens back to premodem images of
government, and most specifically to hereditary royal authority.
139. The judiciary's relationship to administrative agencies is the particular concern of
Seidenfeld's article. See Seidenfeld, supra note 136.

2122

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 103:2073

The legislature may not turn its attention to the implementation of the
law it has enacted; the judiciary may never consider a case that
challenges her decision. Within an administrative hierarchy, these
relationships are more definitive. Each decisionmaker is usually aware
of the particular person or group of persons who will supervise his
decision, and supervision is generally carried out more frequently and
more immediately.
In fact, administrative hierarchies typically display a feature that
can be described as second-order accountability. Those who supervise
subordinates and hold these subordinates accountable in various
ways, are themselves accountable to those superior to them, and
specifically, they are accountable for the way in which they hold their
subordinates accountable.140 That is, one of the crucial tasks that most
administrators must perform is the supervision of subordinates, and
they are typically judged, or held accountable, for the quality of that
supervision. Thus, the superintendent of public Works will be judged
by her superior - the mayor, perhaps - based on the way that she
holds the chief accountable. She is expected to monitor his
performance, make sure he carries out his assigned tasks effectively,
and discipline him if he fails to do so. The superintendent, in turn, will
judge the chief by the way he holds the manual workers accountable
for their performance, and her judgment of the chiefs supervision of
the manual employees in the department will in turn be a factor in her
superior's judgment of her performance. Thus, an administrative
hierarchy is frequently a chain of accountability, and the idea of
accountability serves as an essential feature in the construction and
operation of the hierarchy.
The second element involved in holding someone accountable is
the standard that is applied. This standard may be either procedural or
substantive, that is, it may specify a decision process or a desired
result. In the example given above, a procedural standard would
instruct the chief how to carry out the task in question - how often to
cut the grass, what kind of weed killer to use, how many people should
be assigned to picking up trash, and when the grass has become so
worn that it needs to be replaced. A substantive standard would tell
the chief what results he is expected to achieve - that the lawns
should look neat, clean, and well maintained, or that the grass should
never be more than half-an-inch high and that there should be no
visible weeds or trash.
We might also describe the second situation by saying that the
chief has been granted discretion, but, as I have discussed elsewhere,141
140. See generally, HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (2 d ed. 1957).
141. RUBIN, supra note 138; Edward L. Rubin, Discretion and Its Discontents, 72 CHI.
KENT L. REV. 1 299 (1997). For related views, see M.P. Baumgartner, The Myth of
Discretion, in THE USES OF DISCRETION 129 (Keith Hawkins ed., 1 992); Martha S. Feldman,
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there are many reasons for avoiding this locution. To say that the chief
has been granted discretion sounds like he has been given an explicit
authorization to control some subject matter as he sees fit, like a
medieval tax farmer or a colonial grantee. This is inconsistent with the
structure of modern administrative governance. Specifying the results
one wants a subordinate to achieve is not a grant in this sense but an
alternative mode of supervision. It is used when the superior does not
know what procedures will produce the desired result or believes the
subordinate already knows these procedures. Of course, the superior
wants the subordinate to use his j udgment, in the sense of making
good decisions instead of bad ones, but, in an administrative state, it is
judgment directed toward a purpose identified by the superior.
In either case, the chief would be responsible for meeting the
prescribed standard, and his job performance would be assessed on
the basis of his ability to do so. The standard provides the basis on
which the chief can, and usually must, justify his actions to the
superintendent. Just as the first element of accountability, the
hierarchical . relationship, creates the structure of administrative
governance, the second element, defined standards, establishes its
content of this mode of governance. Administrative governance, as
Weber pointed out in his seminal discussion of the subject, is
instrumental in its basic conception; it is not viewed as divinely
inspired, traditionally established, or inherently valuable, but rather as
a means by which the people who compose a given society achieve
their collective goals.142 It does not place people in positions of
authority because of their birth, their status, or their personal
charisma, but because they are qualified to perform specified tasks.
The standards that superiors impose on their subordinates are the
mechanism by which goals are translated into reality, and the
evaluation of subordinates by their superiors is the means by which
the administrators' ability to carry out that task is assessed.
The hierarchical, standard-based process of accountability can be
contrasted with other modes of government organization. In the
premodern era, many public offices were treated as private property.
In the classic case, a tax farmer would purchase the right to collect
certain types of taxes in a certain geographic area from the royal
government. He would then try to collect enough of this tax to earn
back his original investment and make a profit. Similarly, the role of
licensing some commercial function, such as hackney cabs, would be
sold to a private person, who would then derive an income from the

Social Limits to Discretion: An Organizational Perspective, in THE USES OF DISCRETION 163
(Keith Hawkins ed., 1992).

142. 1 WEBER, supra note 4, at 212-26.
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licensing fees.143 This approach, which is practical for a state that lacks
administrative capacities, does not rely on the mechanism of
accountability. The tax farmer is not in a hierarchical relationship
within the royal government; he is a private person operating outside
that government, and relating to it as a private property owner. No
standards are imposed on him; his only obligation is to pay the
purchase price, and he is then free to use any legal methods that he
chooses and collect as much or as little tax money as he cares to.
An indolent tax farmer who failed to collect much money would do
the government no harm and would be a blessing for those subject to
the tax.
Private property in general, both historically and conceptually,
may be thought of as a grant of authority without accountability. In
the feudal system of the Middle Ages, the king owned all the land
in the realm, but he granted most of it as fiefs to private persons.
These grantees, or vassals, then became rulers of the territory they
were granted, keeping the peace, dispensing justice, caring for the
poor, and managing relations with the church and other .vassals. The
ways that they carried out these functions were of no direct concern
of the king, who generally did not impose standards on the vassal.
While the relationship was strongly hierarchical in its overall structure,
this hierarchy was based on status, not function; that is, the
king's superiority was determined by his identity as king, and the
fact that he had originally granted the land, not on his ability to give
orders or instructions to the vassal.144 Today, we retain, somewhat
anachronistically, this same idea about property. 1 45 As Robert Nozick
declares, "The central core of the notion of a property right in X,
143. ERNEST BARKER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICES IN WESTERN
EUROPE 1660-1930 (1966); HOWARD G. BROWN, WAR, REVOLUTION, AND THE
BUREAUCRATIC STATE (1995); CLIVE H. CHURCH, REVOLUTION AND RED TAPE: THE
FRENCH MINISTERIAL BUREAUCRACY 1770-1850 (1981); HELEN M. JEWELL, ENGLISH
LOCAL ADMINISTRATION IN THE MIDDLE AGES (1972); GIANFRANCO POGGI, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN STATE (1978); HANS ROSENBERG, BUREAUCRACY,
ARISTOCRACY, AND AUTOCRACY: THE PRUSSIAN EXPERIENCE 1660-1 81 5 (1958).
144. The principal duty that a vassal owed his overlord was loyalty, that is, not to take
up arms against him. The other duties were regarded as contractual - providing a certain
number of knights in time of war, or patrolling a border. See MARC BLOCH, FEUDAL
SOCIETY 145-75 (L.A. Manyon, trans., 1961); HEINRICH FICHTENAU, LIVING IN THE TENTH
CENTURY 138-56 (Patrick J. Geary trans., 1991); F.L. GANSHOF, FEUDALISM 69-93 (Philip
Grierson trans., 3d ed. 1996).
145. Many property theorists still subscribe to the classic statement of Blackstone that
property is the "sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the
universe." 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2
(facsimile reprint, Univ. of Chicago Press 1979) (1766). See A.M. Honore, Ownership, in
OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961); EPSTEIN, supra note 133,
at 22-23; STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 17 (1990); ROBERT NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 171 (1974); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE
PROPER'ry 47 (1988).
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relative to which other parts of the notion are to be explained, is
the right to determine what shall be done with X; the right to
choose which of the constrained set of options concerning X shall be
realized or attempted."146 In other words, the property owner is not
accountable to any superior authority for her use of her property.
Another mode of government organization that can be contrasted
with accountability is election. Elections, as discussed above, are
primarily designed to solve the problem of succession and serve as an
alternative to the administrative process of appointment. When a
public official is elected, she owes her position to the voters and is thus
removed from the governmental hierarchy. She cannot be given direct
orders by another government official, nor can specific standards be
imposed on her performance. Indeed, the rhetoric of election often
centers on this sort of independence; some states elect their lieutenant
governor or their attorney general, as opposed to appointing them, for
the precise purpose of removing that person from the administrative
control of the chief executive.
All these categories of government organization, whether
administrative or nonadministrative, are being described conceptually,
as Weberian ideal types.147 In practice, of course, public officials in a
hierarchy may be able to operate quite independently, while modern
property owners are often subject to so many administrative
regulations that they are virtual designees of the regulatory agency.
The point of this discussion, however, is not to describe any particular
governmental agency or function, but to explore the concept of
accountability. This will then enable us to speak of insufficient
accountability, apparent accountability, excessive accountability, and
so forth. There is no harm in identifying a mode of governmental
organization, even if it occasionally or often fails to be carried out in
practice. What is important to avoid is the use of a term that has no
underlying reality in the practice it purports to describe.
B.

Standards of Accountability

One way to understand the nature of accountability more clearly is
to pursue the distinction between procedural and substantive
standards. This distinction, like all dichotomies, creates a risk of
oversimplification, but it meets the basic criterion for a useful
categorization because its implications illuminate the subject matter. It

146. NOZICK, supra note 145, at 171. The constraints Nozick is referring to are the
general rules of criminal and civil law: "My property rights in my knife allow me to leave it
where I will, but not in your chest." Id.
147. See 1 Weber, supra note 4, at 20-21; WEBER, Objectivity, supra note 106, at 89-106.
See FRITZ RINGER, MAX WEBER'S METHODOLOGY: THE UNIFICATION OF THE CULTURAL
AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 110-21 (1997).
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is, however, only one of many possible ways to dichotomize the
standards by which a superior can hold a subordinate accountable.
Other possibilities are the distinctions between general and specific
standards, between standards that exercise control and those that
encourage learning, and between standards that state roles in advance
and those that involve subsequent monitoring. These will be
considered briefly below.
The most important implication of the distinction between
procedural and substantive standards of accountability is that the
former is internal to the agency, while the latter is external. That is to
say, a procedural standard imposes requirements that can be observed
and assessed by considering only the operation of the agency itself,
while a substantive standard imposes requirements that can only be
observed and assessed by looking outside the agency. The
superintendent can determine how often the Grounds Department
cuts the grass by observing the Grounds Department itself, but she can
only determine whether the grass is ever more than half-an-inch high
by looking at the actual grass. It follows from this distinction that
substantive standards are more complex, but that they are less subject
to distortion and manipulation.
Which standard requires more knowledge on the superintendent's
part about the matter being regulated or controlled? It is difficult to
say without microanalysis.148 An initial reaction might be that the
procedural standard requires more knowledge; instructing the chief to
cut the grass to a half inch every ten days may suggest that the
superintendent knows that the grass will not grow to more than an
inch in height during the intervening period. On the other hand, she
may have no idea; the only thing about grass cutting that she may
know is that her budget only allows for cutting it every ten days.
Conversely, a substantive standard may initially seem to demand a
lower level of knowledge; perhaps the superintendent has no idea how
fast grass grows, but simply has a mental image of a nice-looking lawn
where the grass is no more than an inch high. If she does not know
how often grass must be cut in order to maintain that height, however,
her standard may have unexpected and unpleasant budgetary
implications. Moreover, the fact that a lawn looks nice when the grass
is less than one-inch high reflects a certain level of knowledge. In
other words, the amount of knowledge that a superior is required
to possess depends on the interaction between the accountability
standard and the internal and external conditions that it affects. If
the superintendent is content to accept any external results, a

148. For a description of microanalysis, see Edward L. Rubin, Commentary, The New
Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1393 (1996).
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procedural standard demands relatively little knowledge of external
circumstances on her part. If she wants to achieve particular results,
however, procedural standards demand more knowledge, because she
must predict the results of the procedures she requires. A substantive
standard demands considerably less knowledge than a procedural one,
but only if the superintendent is relatively unconcerned about the
costs incurred and about the ability of her subordinates to carry out
the task.
This last consideration suggests that there is another type of
knowledge that is implicated in the choice between procedural and
substantive accountability standards - knowledge about one's
subordinates, or the subordinate agency. If the subordinate agency is
truculent or poorly managed, it may be better to tell it exactly what to
do, via a procedural standard, rather than letting it decide on its own
strategy. On the other hand, accountability standards of this sort can
lead to purely formal obedience with no positive result, as in the old
joke about the workers who are instructed to build a new machine
exactly like the old one and proceed to do so, reproducing all the worn
out features of the original. Substantive standards may impose a
stricter discipline on the subordinate agent because it is being held
accountable for particular results. The fact that these results depend
on the state of the world, however, rather than simply a performance
by the agency, can lead to complaints and excuses whose validity is
difficult for the superior to assess. As James Q. Wilson points out, the
choice between these standards may also depend on the nature of the
agency's task. In some agencies, such as mental hospitals, the
procedures are observable but the outcome is not, while in others,
such as the Army Corps of Engineers, the outcome is observable but
the procedures are not.149 This will influence, if not determine, the
preferable standard of accountability.
The superior's knowledge of the agency interacts with another
crucial consideration - the manner in which the superior enforces the
standards on her subordinates. Enforcing procedural standards is
often simpler, because the standard specifies a required behavior by
subordinates, and that behavior can be observed directly, or described
in reports. Substantive standards involve greater complexities because
they refer to a condition of the outside world, rather than a
performance by the subordinates. Substantive standards can be either
subjective or objective. The superintendent might tell the chief that
she wants the lawns to look good, or pleasant, or spectacular and then
decide whether he has achieved this standard by examining them
herself or having a different subordinate examine them and report to
149. WILSON, supra note 135, at 158-71. The other two types of agencies, according to
Wilson, are those where both the procedures and the outcomes are observable, such as the
IRS, and those where neither is observable, such as public schools.
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her. Alternatively, the superintendent might establish a set of specified
criteria that she wants the chief to meet. She might prescribe that the
grass must be no more than one-quarter-inch high, that there must be
no visible weeds or bare spots, and that there must never be more than
one piece of trash per square five yards. Such objective standards have
an undeniable appeal and lie at the core of the well-known technique
of "management by objectives. "150 They are often more suitable for
simpler, less creative governmental functions, however. Suppose the
Grounds Department is not only supposed to maintain the lawns but
to embellish them with floral arrangements of its own design. An
objective description of a flower bed might lead to a hideous mixture
of fast-growing plants, while a subjective standard would compel the
department to consider well-known, if difficult to articulate, aesthetic
effects.
As the enforcement issue suggests, the complexity of the
subordinate's task and the types of standards that are used to assess it
often depend on whether the task involves the behavior of other
human beings, typically private persons. What makes the public
buildings example a relatively simple one is that at least two of the
tasks, keeping the grass short and removing weeds, refer to conditions
of the natural world that respond to fixed, external conditions, like the
seasons or the amount of rainfall. Strategic and collaborative behavior
with the agency's subject matter are unlikely to be present - you
can't collude with grass. The other two tasks, cleaning up trash and
replacing grass that has been destroyed by foot traffic, might also be
fixed, external conditions for the Grounds Department, depending on
its scope of authority. If it can fine people for littering or walking on
the grass, or put up "Keep Off the Grass" signs, then human behavior
is involved in its performance. But if it does not have such authority,
then littering and foot traffic are fixed, external conditions so far as its
performance is concerned. It cannot alter them but can only respond
by taking corrective action - picking up the trash and replacing the
grass that has been destroyed.
Circumstances of this kind apply in a variety of administrative
settings when the government is operating its own facilities. In other
settings, including almost all regulatory settings, the agency's
performance depends on the behavior of human beings outside the
agency, and frequently outside the government. This does not change
the basic character of accountability, as a supervisory technique, but it
does introduce a variety of complex issues. Specifying procedures
150. See STEPHEN CARROLL, JR. & HENRY L. TOSI, JR., MANAGEMENT BY
OBJECTIVES: APPLICATIONS AND RESEARCH (1973); PETER F. DRUCKER, MANAGING FOR
RESULTS: ECONOMIC TASKS AND RISK-TAKING DECISIONS (1964); PETER F. DRUCKER,
MANAGEMENT: TASKS, RESPONSIBILffiES, PRACTICES (1974); GEORGE L. MORRISEY,
MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES AND RESULTS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1976).
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demands extensive knowledge on the supervisor's part, because the
results that the procedures will produce will now depend on an
ongoing interaction between the agency and outside parties who are
capable of strategic action. Specifying results, on the other hand, may
lead to entirely unrealistic standards that the supervisor cannot
enforce, thus negating any sense of accountability. In fact, formulating
realistic substantive standards under these conditions may be so
difficult that the supervisor may be inclined to restrict herself to
procedural standards, not because they are more effective but because
they allow her to satisfy her own superior, to whom she is accountable
through second-order accountability, that she is at least doing
something.
Relying on procedural accountability standards because
substantive standards are too complex to formulate in regulatory
situations may not seem to be a very promising approach, but it is a
standard feature of American administrative governance, particularly
when institutions outside an administrative agency are trying to hold
the agency accountable. In supervising executive administrative
agencies, for example, the president relies heavily on the Office of
Management and Budget's meta-regulation. 1 51 This requires agencies
to engage in cost-benefit analysis, often rejecting regulations because
the agency failed to perform the analysis correctly .152 Similarly,
Congress has instructed courts, through the Administrative Procedure
Act, to invalidate regulations because the agency failed to follow the
statutorily required procedures. 1 53 Critics of this approach have
pointed out that it often leads to counterproductive results, "ossifying"
the administrative process with excessively elaborate procedures
that interfere with its effectiveness.154 Although reliance on procedural
151. See supra Part I.A.
152. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), amended by and combined with
Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986), in Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994),
amended by Exec. Order No. 13,258, 3 C.F.R. 204 (2003).
153. See MARSHALL R. GOODMAN & MARGARET T. WRIGHTSON, MANAGING
REGULATORY REFORM: THE REAGAN STRATEGY AND ITS IMPACT (1987); James F.
Blumstein, Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the president: An Overview and
Policy Analysis of Current Issues, 51 DUKE L.J. 851 (2001); Harold H. Bruff, presidential
Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 533 (1989); Morton
Rosenberg, presidential Control ofAgency Rulemaking: A n Analysis of Constitutional Issues
that May be Raised by Executive Order 12,291, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 199 (1981).
154. R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN
AIR ACT (1983); Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Inside the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration: Legal Determinants of Bureaucratic Organization and Performance,
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 443 (1990); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); Richard J. Piece, Jr., Two Problems
in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial
Deterrence ofAgency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300 (1988); Patricia M. Wald, Regulation
at Risk: Are Couns Pan of the Solution or Most of the Problem?, 67 S. CAL. L. REv.
621 (1994).
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accountability standards has become virtually habitual at the
highest levels of American government, it is far from unavoidable, and
it is certainly not the exclusive accountability approach within
administrative agencies.
There are several other ways of dichotomizing accountability
standards that are also illuminating and that interact with the crucial
distinction between procedural and substantive standards. One is the
distinction between standards that are specific and those that are
generally stated. A specific standard is one that provides a lot of detail
about whatever is being ordered, that contains precise, measurable
requirements rather than open-ended terms, and that does not
authorize the subordinate to make decisions on its own; a generally
stated standard is the reverse. In judge-made or statutory law, this
distinction is often described as the dichotomy between rules and
standards.155 It is a separate consideration from the procedural or
substantive character of accountability standards described above,
which means that all the combinations of the two distinctions are
possible and, indeed, quite common. In the Grounds Department
example, a general procedural standard would instruct the chief to cut
the grass, collect the trash, and replant worn areas on a regular basis.
A highly specific procedural standard would require the chief to cut
the grass every ten days and remove a defined set of weeds every five
days, to collect all visible trash. every other day, and to resod any area
where bare earth was showing within three days. A general
substantive standard would be to keep the lawns neat and clean. A
highly specific substantive standard might state that the grass must
never be more than one inch high, that there must never be more than
one visible weed or piece of trash per three square yards, and that
there must never be more than three square inches of exposed dirt on
any of the designated lawns.
General standards, whether procedural or substantive, may be
employed because the superior trusts the subordinate, or because she
does not know enough to be more precise, or because she has other
means of controlling her subordinates. Any definitive explanation of
why these standards, as opposed to more specific ones, are being used
requires microanalysis. Even the principle that specific standards
indicate more intensive supervision may not always apply. Because of
second-order accountability, the supervisor may prefer to issue
specific standards even in a situation where they do not effectively

155. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES (1991); Louis Kaplow, Rules
versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Russell B. Korobkin,
Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23
(2000); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 175 (1989);
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 24
(1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995).
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control the subordinate; similarly, when she has complete control of
the subordinate, abjuring specific standards may insulate her from
such second-order accountability and leave the subordinate within her
exclusive control. One thing that can be said is that the dichotomy
between general and specific standards interacts with the internal and
external aspect of the procedural-substantive distinction. Specifying a
procedural standard involves closer regulation of operations within
the administrative agency, while specifying substantive standards
involves closer regulation of the agency's effect on others. It also
interacts with the distinction between subjective and objective
substantive standards. Generally speaking, subjective standards ("act
in a way that pleases me") will tend to be inherently general, but even
this principle may not apply if the subordinate possesses intimate
knowledge of the superior's preferences.
Still another crucial distinction between different standards of
accountability involves the contrast between command and learning.
Command means that the superior will attempt to tell the subordinate
what to do and hold the subordinate accountable for doing it.
Learning relies on the subordinate to fill in details, change the
procedures with changes in circumstances, or even modify the desired
result and holds the subordinate accountable for carrying out that
process in some particular way. Learning is preferable to command
when the superior knows the result it is trying to achieve but does not
know the means for achieving it, when circumstances are likely to
change in ways that the superior cannot predict, or when the superior
does not even know the precise result that she desires.156 Most of the
implementation approaches suggested by New Public Governance rely
on learning, although they tend to focus on learning by regulated
parties, rather than by subordinates within the administrative
apparatus.157
The choice of the learning approach is typically associated with
general, rather than specific standards of accountability, but it also
interacts with the substantive-procedural dichotomy. The first learning
situation, where the superior wants the subordinate to take account of
changing circumstances, leads to the use of purely substantive
standards of accountability, or very general procedural standards. This
is relatively well understood and well accepted; administrators are "on
the ground" or "in the trenches" or in some other low-lying
metaphorical position where they regularly receive information that is

156. See CHRIS ARGYRIS, REASONING, LEARNING, AND ACTION: INDIVIDUAL AND
ORGANIZATIONAL (1982); CHRIS ARGYRIS & DONALD A. SCHON, ORGANIZATIONAL
LEARNING: A THEORY OF ACTION PERSPECTIVE (1978); EDGAR S. DUNN, JR., ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: A PROCESS OF SOCIAL LEARNING (1971); JOHN FRIEDMANN,
PLANNING IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: FROM KNOWLEDGE TO ACTION 181-224 (1987).
157. See supra note 105 (citing sources).
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unavailable to their superior, or not known to anyone at the time the
superior initiates the program.158 The second situation, where the
superior cannot determine the means of achieving a desired result, is
sometimes treated as a failure of technical knowledge or political
nerve by the superior,1 59 but can also be seen as an honest, empirically
oriented approach to the problem of governance. Like the first, it can
be achieved by using purely substantive standards, which can be
promulgated with a high degree of specificity, or very general
procedural ones. The third situation, where the superior simply
defines the area of concern and instructs the agency to develop its own
goals through a learning process, may seem the most problematic. But
as scholars such as Michael Dorf, Susan Sturm, and Cass Sunstein
note, a superior can fulfill its function by engaging other institutions in
a dialogue about desirable norms.160 That is, the superior need not
regard itself as the sole source of policy initiatives, but may view itself
as participating in a mutual learning process with its subordinates. In
this situation, the subordinate would need to rely on highly
generalized substantive standards or on generalized procedural
standards with no substantive standards.
These three reasons to rely on the subordinate's ability to learn
can be illustrated by the Grounds Department example. To illustrate
the first learning situation, it might be difficult for the superintendent
to know how quickly the grass and weeds will grow, because the rate
of growth depends on the amount of rainfall and how much trash or
foot traffic there will be, since this depends on variations in people's
need to visit public buildings. Consequently, a procedural standard of
cutting the grass every ten days may lead to either inadequate or
excessive grass-cutting; if the superintendent feels that she must use a
procedural standard, it might be best to state this standard very
generally, such as cutting the grass regularly, or whenever needed. A
substantive standard of keeping the grass no more than one inch high
seems more promising, although it may have unacceptable budgetary
implications at certain times. The second learning situation would
apply if no one has any idea how best to get rid of weeds, a procedural
standard is impractical, and only a substantive standard will allow the
Department to learn an effective method over time. (If the simplicity
of the example makes such ignorance seem unlikely, consider the

158. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation After Whitman v. American
Trucking Ass'ns, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 452 (2002); see also Lisa Bressman, Beyond
A ccountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the A dministrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
461 (2003).
159. REDISH, supra note 7; SCHOENBROD, supra note 7; Aranson et al., supra note 7.
160. Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
875 (2003); Sturm, supra note 100; Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term,
Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 1 10 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996).
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more complex task of adding ornamentation to make the lawns more
attractive.) Finally, the third learning situation may occur if the
underlying reason why the city wants to have attractive lawns in front
of public buildings is to attract more people into the buildings. The
superintendent, taking attractiveness as her basic goal, might
promulgate either procedural or substantive standards to achieve that
goal. If she would allow her subordinates to engage her in a dialogue
about this goal, their learning may convince them, and ultimately
convince the superintendent, that attractive lawns are not particularly
important. It might be more desirable to have lawns that are
welcoming, perhaps by having food stands, kiddie rides, and sitting
places scattered across them.
One more dichotomy between accountability standards, although
far from the last one that might be considered, is the superior's choice
whether to issue instructions in advance or to monitor the
subordinate's performance and issue judgments on a continuing basis.
Ashutosh Bhagwat discusses this as the choice between ex ante and ex
post regulation,1 61 while McCubbins and Schwartz describe it as the
choice between "police-patrol" and "fire-alarm" modes of legislative
oversight. 162 Issuing instructions in advance generally possesses the
virtue of clarity but suffers from the vice of inflexibility, while
continuous monitoring exhibits the opposite features. One can
ameliorate the vice of instructions stated in advance by making these
instructions open ended but only at a partial sacrifice of clarity. One
can ameliorate the vice of continuous monitoring by following a
pattern that is transparent to the subordinate, but then one has
sacrificed a certain amount of flexibility. Of course, the two
approaches can be combined, which either amplifies their individual
virtues, amplifies their individual vices, or produces previously
unimagined complexities.
The choice between instructions stated in advance and continuous
monitoring is independent of the choice between specifying
procedures and specifying results, since the supervisor can specify
either the procedures or the results in advance, or monitor either on a
continuous basis. It is sometimes argued that it is equivalent to the
choice between general and specific standards: a specific standard
prescribes conduct prior to its occurrence, while a general one allows
room for monitoring, or subsequent assessment. 163 This is true to the
161. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Modes of Regulatory Enforcement and the Problem of
Administrative Discretion, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1275 (1999). Bhagwat's discussion focuses on
the way administrative agencies supervise private parties, but executive, legislative or
judicial supervision of agencies follows a similar pattern.
162. McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 25.
163. See Kaplow, supra note 155, at 557; Sullivan, supra note 155, at 58-64; Sunstein,
supra note 155, at 961.
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extent that one is looking at the superior's initial instruction;
specificity at the outset precludes the development of standards
through case-by-case monitoring of the subordinate's performance.
But in an administrative setting, a standard stated in advance can be
specific or general, and monitoring can lead to either general or
specific assessments of the agency's performance. For example, the
superintendent might instruct the chief, in advance, to cut the grass
regularly or to cut it every ten days, which are general and specific
procedural standards, or she might instruct the chief, also in advance,
to make the lawns look nice or keep the grass no more than one inch
high, which are general and specific substantive standards.
Alternatively, she might simply tell the chief to maintain the lawns,
and then examine the laws on a continuing basis. This continuous
monitoring can also be either general or specific. The superintendent
can tell the chief that he is cutting the grass too often, or that he has
cut the grass two days early, or she can tell him that the lawns look
scruffy or that the grass is one-half-inch too high.
C.

What Lies Beneath: By Way of a Conclusion

It might be possible to construct an enormous, multi-dimensional
grid to plot the interactions among these various types of
accountability standards, although there is no reason to think that
these dichotomies are the only useful ones. The point of this cursory
discussion, however, is not to solve the problem of administrative
supervision, but simply to indicate that holding someone accountable
is a complex, technical task. The various factors discussed above
indicate how fully the concept of accountability is tied into an
administrative hierarchy and requires the sort of continuous, intensive
interaction between superior and subordinate that is characteristic of
this hierarchy. In order to hold a person accountable for his
performance, a person must decide whether to employ procedural or
substantive standards, general or specific instructions, control or
learning, orders given in advance or continuous monitoring, and a
variety of other factors. She must consider how each of these decisions
interact with each other and with the characteristics of the
subordinate, the nature of the task to be performed, and the actions of
those beyond her or her subordinate's control.
When viewed from this perspective, it seems apparent that voters
cannot, through the process of election, hold a public official
accountable in any real sense, that local populations cannot hold local
officials accountable, and that government cannot achieve its aims by
making people accountable for themselves. Elections solve the
problem of succession more effectively than any other methods and
produce a certain generalized responsiveness to citizen desires on the
part of elected officials. Local administration is often the most
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efficient way to deal with governmental tasks, from a managerial point
of view. Devolution of responsibility to private actors is often an
efficient managerial strategy as well, and it can produce important
benefits in terms of morale and good will.
But none of these techniques are mechanisms of accountability.
Consideration of the actual mechanisms, as they are implemented in
an administrative hierarchy, emphasize the distance between true
accountability and elections, localism, and private responsibility.
Elected officials respond to some of the deeply felt, or widely held
views of the electorate; local officials exhibit some similarity of
outlook with those they govern; and private persons can sometimes be
induced to consider the consequences of their actions from a public
perspective. But these general and occasional correspondences do not
enable one actor to demand an explanation or justification of another
actor for its actions and to reward or punish that second actor on the
basis of its performance. Obligations of this sort can only be imposed
in a tightly integrated hierarchy, such as those found within the
administrative apparatus. One can always slap the word accountability
down on the page if one wants to argue for increased reliance on
elected officials, local officials, or private parties, but the underlying
concept does not apply.
If this is true, then why have accountability arguments become so
popular? The answer lies in our ambivalence toward administrative
government. On the one hand, modern Western societies have
irrevocably committed themselves to an administrative system and can
no longer even conceive of parting with the advantages that this
system provides. Accountability is one of these advantages. It would
be simply impossible to manage the complex tasks of modern
government and implement generally debated and articulated policies
without the elaborate administrative mechanisms through which
subordinate officials are held accountable for their performance, On
the other hand, there is a widespread hostility toward administrative
government, a desire for simplicity, community, and freedom of action
that the heavy, complex machinery of modern government seems to
have obliterated. The discourse of accountability is an effort to argue
that we can capture the necessary advantages of the administrative
state without subjecting ourselves to its oppressiveness. Let us shift
authority from the administrative apparatus back to the president, to
Congress, to state officials, to local officials, to private parties, to
anyone else. We can still have accountability - in fact we can have
more accountability - because elected officials will be accountable to
the voters, local officials will be accountable to their communities, and
private parties will be accountable to themselves. We will have then
achieved the magical result of supervision without supervisors, of
hierarchical control without hierarchy, of effective administration
without administrative government.
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This is, however, an illusion. All types of magic are illusions. We
know this now, and we know it through a mode of thought that is
intimately connected with the development of the modem
administrative state. Part of the connection is pragmatic. Western
society has learned, over the course of the last five hundred years or
so, that if we want to have a more comfortable, convenient, and
prosperous life, we must stop casting spells and start learning science.
Once this scientific approach takes hold, it produces a massive,
complex, specialized technological culture - a culture that can only
be subjected to public control through an administrative apparatus.
But the connection between the decline of magic and the
administrative state is also conceptual. After centuries of political
conflict, society has managed to deny governments their claims that
they owe their authority to God and their ability to mystify and
overawe the populace. Government, we now know, is a socially
created mechanism designed to serve the people's needs; as a result, it
is no longer monarchical or theocratic, but administrative in its
essential orientation. So we are finished with magic, both in the
material and the political arena, and the consequence is administrative
government. The idea that we can have accountability without
administration is magical thinking, as outmoded as the idea that we
can control reality through incantations, or that government is a divine
creation. It is enticing, but we have learned that we are better off with
science and democracy, even if the price we have to pay for these
advantages is administrative governance.

